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Article Nine's Treatment of Commingled Cash
Proceeds in Non-Insolvency Cases
William H. Henning *
INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult questions arising under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is the extent to which a
secured party's interest in collateral' continues to be enforce-
able against the proceeds2 generated upon disposition of that
collateral. Much of the difficulty surrounding this issue
springs from the fact that proceeds occupy a position at the
nexus of two competing Code policies. On the one hand,
Article 9 validates the floating lien 3 and minimizes the extent
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. This article
was adapted from the author's thesis, approved in partial satisfaction of the L.L.M.
requirements at the University of Illinois College of Law.
1. Collateral is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c). Unless otherwise indicated, all
references in this article are to the 1972 version of Article 9.
2. U.C.C, § 9-306(1) provides:
"'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collec-
tion or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by rea-
son of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it
is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement. Money,
checks, deposit accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds.' All other pro-
ceeds are 'non-cash proceeds.'"
This provision differs from the 1962 version by expressly including insurance pay-
ments as proceeds and by inclusion of deposit accounts in the definition of cash
proceeds.
3. U.C.C. § 9-205 provides in part that:
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collat-
eral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise
accounts or chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or make reposses-
sions, or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the fail-
ure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds or
replace collateral.
The purpose of this provision was to repeal cases like Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S.
353, 45 S. Ct. 566, 69 L. Ed. 991 (1925), which had interpreted New York law to void
accounts receivable financing arrangements which allowed the debtor too much do-
minion over the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-205, Comment I.
Benedict v. Ratner was one manifestation of judicial hostility toward secret liens
created by allowing the debtor to retain possession and control of collateral. For
additional discussion of the role of U.C.C. § 9-205 in the context of commingled cash
proceeds, see text at notes 124-130 infra.
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to which a secured party must continue to "police" a trans-
action once his interest has been perfected. On the other
hand, it is important for third parties to be able to ascertain
the extent to which property in a debtor's possession is sub-
ject to encumbrances. 4 The problem becomes especially se-
vere when the proceeds are cash proceeds that have become
commingled with funds from other sources in the debtor's
general banking account.
The Code addresses some of the problems associated
with proceeds through a network of complex provisions, but
many of the most important issues cannot be resolved by di-
rect reference to statutory language. For example, when a
secured party has an enforceable security interest in collat-
eral, section 9-203(3) grants him, absent agreement to the
contrary, "the right to proceeds provided by section 9-306."5
This ties in with section 9-306(2), which states the general
rule that "a security interest . . . continues in any identifi-
able proceeds including collections received by the debtor."'6
4. The conflict between these opposing principles is neatly illustrated by the
1972 revision of U.C.C. § 9-306(3). Under the 1962 version of U.C.C. § 9-306(3), a
security interest in proceeds was temporarily perfected for 10 days and was then con-
tinuously perfected if the interest in the original collateral was perfected by a filed
financing statement that also covered proceeds. The 1972 revisions reduce the scope
of perfection so that after the 10 day period of temporary perfection a prospective
lender can always find on file, in the appropriate office for the type of collateral
against which he contemplates making a loan, a financing statement showing that at
least some property of the prospective debtor is encumbered.
Since this article deals primarily with the identifiability of cash proceeds and
since U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) provides for continuous perfection without refiling where
"a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are identi-
fiable cash proceeds," it will be presumed, unless otherwise stated, that if cash pro-
ceeds are identifiable then the secured party's interest in them is perfected. For
further discussion of U.C.C. § 9-306(3), see text at notes 143-147 infra.
5. This provision for an automatic interest in proceeds resolved an apparent
ambiguity in the 1962 version that had caused some concern that courts would hold
that a claim to proceeds had to be based on a specific clause in the security agreement.
See, FINAL REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, Appendix E-19, at 218 (April 25, 1971); Epstein, "Proceeding"
under the Un!form Commercial Code, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 787 (1969); 1 G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 11.4 at 351.
6. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) also continues the security interest in the original collat-
eral unless the disposition was authorized or a specific provision of Article 9 provides
otherwise. Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 9-306 notes that "[tihe secured party may claim
both proceeds and collateral, but may of course have only one satisfaction."
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From these rules, it seems clear that the security interest
does not continue in proceeds unless those proceeds remain
identifiable, but nowhere does the Code define what is
meant by the term "identifiable." When cash proceeds be-
come commingled with funds from other sources, an issue
arises as to whether the commingling destroys identifiability.
If it does, the security interest is no longer enforceable
against the proceeds. Even without commingling, an argu-
ment can be made that depositing cash proceeds in a bank
account prevents them from being recovered in specie,
thereby rendering them unidentifiable.
The question whether commingled cash proceeds re-
main identifiable may arise in a variety of contexts. By far
the most common situation involves a conflict between a
bank which has exercised a right of set-off against the ac-
count and a secured party claiming that the set-off was
wrongful as to property subject to its security interest;7 but
the conflict may also be a priority fight between two secured
parties8 or between a secured party and a creditor with a ju-
dicial lien on the account, usually arising out of garnishment
proceedings.9 Where funds have been withdrawn from the
account, the secured party may seek to assert his interest
against new assets purchased with the funds 0 or against re-
cipients of the funds, including cases where the bank is the
7. Nat'l Acceptance Co. of America v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp.
1078, 30 UCC Rep. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1980); Morris Plan of St. Joseph v. Broadway
Nat'l Bank, 598 S.W.2d 557, 28 UCC Rep. 1112 (Mo. App. 1980); Citizens Nat'l Bank
v. Mid-States Development Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 24 UCC Rep. 1321 (Ind. App.
1978); Domain Indus., Inc. v. First Security Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d 165, 16
UCC Rep. 1417 (Iowa 1975); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western
Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33, 13 UCC Rep. 1202 (1974); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 13 UCC Rep. 109 (E.D. Mo. 1973);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d
330, 7 UCC Rep. 1350 (1970).
8. C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip. Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370
(1982).
9. Michigan Nat'1 Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690,
217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1975).
10. C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip. Inc., supra note 8; Girard Trust
Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 25 Pa. D. & C. 2d 395, 1 UCC
Rep. 531 (Pa. Ct. Cm. P1. 1958).
11, Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 202 Ct. C1. 343, 12 UCC
Rep. 902 (1973).
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transferee of funds from the account under circumstances
not involving set-off.12 Finally, the issue may arise where a
secured party seeks to defeat a claim by a bankruptcy trustee
that a payment by the debtor amounted to a voidable prefer-
ence.' 3 In each instance, the court must initially determine
whether the proceeds retained their identifiability after com-
mingling so that the secured party has an interest on which
to base his claim.
In recent years, a series of cases has held that cash pro-
ceeds remain identifiable notwithstanding commingling in
the debtor's bank account.' 4 The courts in many of these
cases have analogized the facts before them to situations in
which constructive trusts have been imposed and have deter-
mined that the debtors should be regarded as trustees of
funds which belong, in equity, to the secured parties. 5 Once
this basic analogy between security arrangements and con-
structive trusts has been established, the secured party is
armed with tracing principles that allow him to determine,
artificially, that portion of the deposit account that is alloca-
12. Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. First American Bank, 614 P.2d 1091, 29 UCC
Rep. 280 (Okla. 1980); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504
F.2d 998, 15 UCC Rep. 553 (7th Cir. 1974).
13. Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279, 1 UCC Rep.
515 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
14. C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Eqpt. Inc., supra note 8; Anderson,
Clayton & Co. v. First American Bank, 614 P.2d 1091, 29 UCC Rep. 280 (Okla.
1980); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-State Development Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 24 UCC
Rep. 1321 (Ind. App. 1978); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank,
504 F.2d 998, 15 UCC Rep. 553 (7th Cir. 1974); Michigan Nat'i Bank v. Flowers
Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1978);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F.Supp. 317, 13 UCC Rep. 109
(E.D. Mo. 1973); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61 Wis.
2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33, 13 UCC Rep. 1202 (1974); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fi-
delity Union Trust Co., I I N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330, 7 UCC Rep. 1350 (1970);
Domain Indus., Inc. v. First Security Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d 165, 16 UCC
Rep. 1417 (Iowa 1975); Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, 25
Pa. D. & C. 2d 395, 1 UCC Rep. 531 (Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl. 1958).
15. C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip. Inc., supra note 8; Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 15 UCC Rep. 553 (7th Cir.
1974); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690,
217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1975); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers
Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 13 UCC Rep. 109 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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ble to proceeds.' 6 Under this approach, "identifiable" is
construed as the equivalent of "traceable."
Research suggests that the drafters, if they considered
the issue at all, did not intend for commingled cash proceeds
to be identifiable. The use of the term "identifiable" in sec-
tion 9-306 and other provisions of Article 9 is ambiguous at
best and in some instances inconsistent with the view that it
is the equivalent of traceable. Tracing originated as an equi-
table remedy to permit an individual wrongfully deprived of
his property to recover that property in specie by means of a
decree of specific restitution; even today its use is generally
dependent on the commission of some wrongful act as the
basis for imposing a constructive trust. That some tracing is
permitted in the commercial world of secured transactions is
implicit in the very concept of a security interest in proceeds,
but this right to trace is modified by the fact that the pro-
ceeds must be identifiable. One possible interpretation is that
simple tracing to specific property is permitted by section 9-
306(2), but the artificial tracing rules that are necessary to
make an allocation of a commingled bank account are not
available to secured parties unless the debtor has committed
a wrongful act.
Courts may have sensed this limitation and sought to
avoid it by resorting to the constructive trust analogy, but
the analogy is weak in the context of many modem financing
arrangements. In cases where the debtor's disposition was
wrongful, there has been a conversion of the collateral; and
the imposition of a constructive trust as a vehicle permitting
the use of artificial tracing rules is appropriate. In such
cases, resort to these rules to follow cash proceeds into com-
mingled accounts is clearly proper, not because the proceeds
are identifiable but because the constructive trust with all its
remedies is available through section 1-103 to supplement
the provisions of the UCC. 17 Where both the disposition of
16. The fictional tracing principles are discussed in detail in the text accompany-
ing notes 103-105 infra.
17. U.C.C. § 1-103 states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capac-
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original collateral and the commingling of proceeds were au-
thorized by the secured party, his relationship with the
debtor is purely commercial and does not contain any of the
elements that have traditionally supported the constructive
trust.
Ultimately, this article takes the position that the use of
artificial tracing rules is not prohibited by the Code and that
the recent cases reach a proper result notwithstanding the
weaknesses of the constructive trust analogy. Since the UCC
encourages secured parties to permit debtors to retain pro-
ceeds and use them in conducting their businesses pending
default, it makes sense to give secured parties who make use
of these liberal provisions some protection. Given the na-
ture of the potential priority conflicts and the fact that third
parties will rarely have relied on the funds in the account in
making extensions of credit, the courts are justified in devel-
oping remedies to assist secured parties, although it should
be recognized that the constructive trust is being employed
as a fiction to permit use of these remedies. On the other
hand, it can be argued that while the Code validates the
floating lien it makes good sense to build in incentives for
the secured party to engage in a modicum of policing. This
article will suggest an approach to conflicts involving rights
of set-off that will penalize the secured party for permitting
commingling in situations where banks actually rely on
funds in the account in deciding to extend credit without
completely stripping him of his security interest in the
proceeds.
This article will approach the issues by examining the
situations in which commingling is likely to occur, reviewing
the right to trace proceeds under some of the pre-Code
financing devices, and analyzing the use of the term "identi-
fiable" in the context of Article 9. It will then examine the
modem line of cases involving secured parties' claims to
commingled cash proceeds and will conclude by suggesting
how some of the potential conflicts can be resolved in a man-
ity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions.
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ner that protects the interests of secured parties while re-
maining sufficiently flexible to grant priority to third parties
in the relatively rare situations where the equities warrant
such a result.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH COMMINGLING OCCURS
As a preliminary matter, it may be helpful to discuss
briefly the situations in which cash proceeds are likely to
find their way into the debtor's bank account, because the
just resolution of conflicts may vary according to the factual
background. Of course, the debtor may make an unauthor-
ized sale of collateral and deposit the proceeds to his ac-
count, but in most cases the disposition of collateral is
authorized by the secured party and the deposit is made with
his express or at least tacit approval. In such cases, the de-
posits may be made to accounts containing only proceeds or
they may be made to accounts to which the debtor also de-
posits funds from other sources. If the account contains only
proceeds, the bank's records may or may not reveal this
fact 18 and the procedure for handling proceeds may or may
not have been specified in the security agreement. Where the
funds are deposited to a commingled account it is less likely
that such a procedure would be expressly approved in the
security agreement, but the secured party may be well aware
of the practice. As with accounts containing only proceeds,
the bank may or may not be aware of the origin of the
deposits.
Cash proceeds are most likely to be deposited by the
debtor where the original collateral is inventory 19 or ac-
counts.20 In the case of inventory, the security agreement
may require the debtor to turn over the proceeds of sale as
soon as they are received or it may call for periodic pay-
18. For example, the account might be listed in the name of the debtor as trustee
for the secured party, or even in the name of the secured party as sole owner with the
debtor authorized to draw checks against the account.
19. Inventory is defined at U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
20. Accounts are defined at U.C.C. § 9-106 and, for present purposes, essentially
mean accounts receivable. They must be distinguished from deposit accounts, which
are defined at U.C.C. § 9-105(i)(e) and generally mean bank accounts.
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ments to the secured party that are unrelated to the sales of
specific items, thus allowing the debtor to use the proceeds in
the conduct of his business. In the latter instance, unless the
parties agree to the establishment of a special bank account
for proceeds the debtor will probably deposit them in his
general account. Even where proceeds are to be turned over
immediately it is likely that the debtor will first deposit them
in his general account and then remit to the secured party,
usually by check drawn on that account. While this practice
may violate the terms of the security agreement in some in-
stances, it is more likely to occur with at least tacit approval
from the secured party.Where the original collateral is accounts, the secured
party may, of course, notify the account debtors and collect
directly from them.2 It is not unusual, however, for the
debtor to make the collections and then remit, a procedure
known as non-notification financing. As with inventory, re-
mittance may be immediate or by periodic payments, and in
either case it is likely that the collections will pass through




In order to appreciate fully the meaning of the term
"identifiable proceeds," it is necessary to examine the rights
of secured creditors under the myriad financing devices that
preceded enactment of the UCC. If there was a right to fol-
low cash proceeds into a commingled bank account under
those devices, that fact would be some evidence of the draft-
ers' intent in promulgating section 9-306(2).
Comment 2(c) to section 9-306 suggests that "whether a
debtor's sale of collateral was authorized or unauthorized,
prior law generally gave the secured party a claim to the pro-
ceeds." That a right to proceeds arose in cases where dispo-
21. Notification financing. U.C.C. § 9-318 provides rules governing the relation-
ship between the assignee (secured party) and the account debtor, a term that is de-
fined at U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a).
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sition was unauthorized is not contested, although there
were occasional cases to the contrary.22 The wrongful dispo-
sition was a conversion, and imposition of a constructive
trust allowing artificial tracing rules to be used was proper.
However, research indicates that the position of Comment.
2(c) with regard to authorized dispositions is too broad. In
the area of chattel mortgages, for example, many courts did
grant the mortgagee a right to proceeds;23 but a substantial
number of cases reached the opposite result,24 frequently on
the ground that consent to sale amounted to a waiver by the
mortgagee of any lien on the proceeds.25 Of course, the cases
denying any right to proceeds are no longer directly relevant
because of the specific Code provisions granting the secured
party an interest in proceeds.
A close reading of the cases leads to the conclusion that
in cases where the disposition of the original collateral was
authorized and the mortgagee was granted an interest in
proceeds, the courts were actually relying on a wrongful act
to achieve an equitable result. The wrongful act was most
frequently a failure by the mortgagor to fulfill a contractual
provision requiring him to account immediately for the pro-
ceeds of sale. It is true that many courts imposed construc-
tive trusts and used tracing terminology, but this seems to
have been based on the finding of an equitable lien as a re-
sult of the mortgagor's failure to account26 and is not analo-
gous to the automatic shift of the security interest to
proceeds to which we have become accustomed under the
22. See, e.g., Bank of Jefferson v. First Nat'l Bank, 158 Okla., 37; 12 P.2d 540
(1932); Talmage-Soyer Co. v. Smith, 91 Mont." 289, 7 P.2d 536 (1932); Riddle v. Et-
ling, 84 Cal. App. 460, 258 P. 162 (1927).
23. See, e.g., Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co. v. Clear Lake Cedar Corp., 15
Wash. 2d 707, 132 P.2d 363 (1943); Slimmer v. State Bank, 134 Minn. 349, 159 N.W.
795 (1916); Farmers State Bank v. Anderson, 112 Neb. 413, 199 N.W. 728 (1924).
24. See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Live Stock Loan Co. v. Blackfoot City Bank, 290 F.
588 (D. Idaho 1921); Tyler Production Credit Ass'n v. Tyler State Bank & Trust Co.,
178 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Great Northern State Bank v. Ryan, 292 F. 10
(8th Cir. 1923).
25. See, e.g., United Film Ad Service v. Roach, 297 S.W. 91 (Mo. App. 1927);
Utah-Idaho Live Stock Loan Co. v. Blackfoot City Bank, 290 F. 588 (D. Idaho 1921).
26. See, e.g., Tyler Production Credit Ass'n v. Tyler State Bank & Trust Co., 178
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Scurry v. Quaker Oats Co., 201 Iowa 1171, 208
N.W. 860 (1926).
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UCC. For example, in Tyler Production Credit Ass'n v. Tyler
State Bank & Trust Co. ,27 the court stated as follows
The sale having been made pursuant to the agreement,
was with the consent of the mortgagee, whereby the pur-
chaser took the property free of the lien, and against
whom the mortgagee can have neither foreclosure nor
damages for conversion . . . . Nor does the mortgage
lien attach to the proceeds of the sale. . . . But there is
nothing in the statutes or decisions of this state to pre-
vent the proceeds from becoming a trust fund, when the
sale is made by the mortgagor pursuant to an agreement
with the mortgagee on condition that the proceeds be ap-
plied on the debt.28
The court in Tyler Production Credit Ass'n saw more clearly
than most that the right to proceeds did not arise automati-
cally, as would be the case today, but instead was tied to the
mortgator's failure to abide by a term in the mortgage in-
strument. The constructive trust was necessary to find any
interest in proceeds, regardless of commingling. This is no
longer necessary under the UCC, and today the constructive
trust is being used not as a basis for finding an interest in
proceeds generally but as a vehicle to extend the automatic
interest in proceeds to commingled funds. The cases are not
all as clear as Tyler Production Credit Ass'n about the origin
of the right to proceeds. Many cases use trust terminology
indiscriminately, and this may have led to the impression
that there was a generally accepted right to trace proceeds
prior to the adoption of the UCC.
In cases where the collateral was inventory, most courts
would not validate the mortgage itself without a clause im-
posing on the mortgagor a duty to account strictly for the
proceeds;29 and attempts to let the mortgagor retain all the
proceeds for use in his business were usually invalidated. 30
27. 178 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
28. Id at 887. (Citations omitted.)
29. According to Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 1338, 1345 n.32 (1939), a clause placing the mortgagor under a duty to account
rendered the mortgage valid in all jurisdictions except Virginia and, perhaps, Illinois.
30. Id at 1346-47. The article notes that several mortgagees tried to overcome
the problem by provisions allowing the mortgagor to retain part of the proceeds and
200
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It is not surprising that the courts imposed constructive trusts
in such cases. Where the mortgagor was under a duty to ac-
count, his failure to do so could be treated as a wrongful act
resulting in the imposition of a constructive trust, thereby
giving the courts a rationale for protecting the mortgagee by
granting him an interest in the proceeds, These cases, then,
are simply not precedent for imposing constructive trusts in
cases decided under the UCC where the secured party's in-
terest in proceeds is automatic. In Code cases in which dis-
position is authorized and the debtor is allowed to keep the
proceeds without being under a duty to account, use of the
constructive trust is clearly a fiction and a means to an end
(the use of artificial tracing rules) notwithstanding its preva-
lence in chattel mortgage cases.
31
The idea that the debtor had to account for proceeds
was carried over into another major inventory financing de-
vice, the trust receipt, and into non-notification receivables
financing in the case of Benedict v. Ratner.32 Because this
article is primarily concerned with situations where the dis-
position of collateral is authorized, the focus of this histori-
cal perspective will be on devices that were used in the
financing of inventory and accounts receivable.
account for the remainder, and some states accepted such provisions. The cases are
collected in the article at p. 1347 nn.36 & 37.
31. This is not to suggest that there are not cases to the contrary of each position
taken in the preceding paragraphs. There are cases in the area of chattle mortgages to
support virtually any position one might care to take, as was pointed out in the fol-
lowing excerpt on one aspect of inventory mortgages dealing with power of sale
clauses from one of the most painstakingly accurate articles ever written in the area:
Briefly, and without purporting to develop the various ramifications into
which this enigma has led the courts, in about half the states a mortgage of a
stock of goods held for resale with a power of sale vested in the mortgagor is
invalid against creditors of the mortgagor, while the other jurisdictions hold
that it is merely evidence of fraud but valid unless additional proof of inten-
tion to defraud creditors is forthcoming. Within these rules can be found a
multitude of variations, apparently without rhyme or reason.
Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 657
(1939).
32. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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I1. Inventory
A. Chattel Mortgages
Until the adoption of the UCC, there were always
problems for creditors seeking to use their debtors' inventory
as collateral. At early common law, any mortgage of per-
sonalty where the mortgagor retained possession was viewed
as a secret lien and therefore fraudulent as to creditors,33 but
by the time inventory financing began to develop in the
nineteenth century the use of possessory mortgages had been
validated in this country by the enactment of chattel mort-
gage recording statutes. The problems with mortgages on
inventory did not stem from the fact that the mortgagor con-
tinued in possession but rather than he had a power to sell
the collateral and that the mortgagee claimed an interest in
new inventory as it was acquired.34
The problem with the after-acquired property clause
sprang from the common law rule that property could not be
encumbered before its acquisition. This rule began to break
down with the development of the doctrine of potential pos-
session, beginning with the case of Grantham v. Hawley,35
and it was thoroughly discarded by Justice Story in the fa-
mous case of Mitchell v. Winslow. 36 Unfortunately, Mitchell
33. Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber, 1601).
34. This article draws heavily from the historical perspectives advanced in the
two volume treatise, G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
(Little, Brown & Co. 1965) (hereinafter cited as GILMORE).
35. Hobart 132, 80 Eng. Rep. 281 (K.B. 1616). For a complete discussion of the
doctrine, see, Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19 HARV. L.
REV. 557 (1906).
36. 17 F. Cas. 527 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9,673). In that case, a manufacturer
obtained a loan and, as security, gave a mortgage on his plant "together with all tools
and machinery. . . which we may at any time purchase for four years from this date,
and also all the stock which we may manufacture or purchase during said four years."
Id at 529. The mortgage was properly recorded and, after default, the mortgagee
took possession of some tools that had been acquired after the mortgage was executed
and sold them to a third party. The mortgagor then declared bankruptcy and the
issue of the validity of the after-acquired property clause came before Justice Story.
He validated the mortgage as follows:
It seems to me a clear result of all the authorities, that wherever the
parties, by their contract, intended to create a positive lien or charge, either
upon real or upon personal property, whether it is then in esse or not, it
attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon the particular property, as soon as
202
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v. Winslow did not permanently dispose of the issue,37 and
the states developed a variety of rules to deal with after-ac-
quired property clauses. 8 Eventually, the courts began to
accept the after-acquired property clause in the context of
equipment financing,39 but the problem of the after-acquired
property clause on inventory was never fully resolved.
Even in states which validated the after-acquired prop-
erty clause, the power of sale clause was likely to vitiate the
mortgage. Obviously, for a mortgage on inventory to be at-
tractive to either lender or borrower, the borrower must have
a power of sale; but the courts in a vast majority of states
held that such a power is fraudulent either as a matter of
law, thereby voiding the mortgage entirely, or is at least pre-
sumptively fraudulent. The idea that a power of sale ren-
dered a mortgage on personality a fraudulent conveyance
stemmed from the view that a debtor with such a power
would appear to third parties as the full owner of the prop-
erty. The mortgagee was seen as having imbued the mortga-
gor with the most important aspect of ownership, the power
of alienation.' This "ostensible ownership" might be used
to defraud other creditors.
the assignor or contractor acquires a title thereto, against the latter, and all
persons asserting a claim thereto, under him, either voluntarily, or with no-
tice, or in bankruptcy.
Id at 533.
37. Four years later, in Moody v. Wright, 54 Mass. 17 (1847), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that a mortgagee under an after-acquired property clause lost to
an assignee for the benefit of creditors where the mortgagee had done nothing to
reperfect his interest after the mortgagor obtained possession of new property.
38. In some states they were valid between the original parties and as to all third
parties, including purchasers, lien creditors and subsequent mortgagees; in some
states they were valid between the original parties but the mortgagee was
subordinated to purchasers and lien creditors whose interests arose before the mortga-
gee took possession or refiled; and in some states they were invalid even between the
original parties. The result was a confusion that deterred creditors from using the
chattel mortgage ,as a security device where the collateral was inventory. These rules
are collected, along with complete annotations, at Cohen & Geber, TheAfter-Acquired
Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939). See also, Stone, The "'Equitable Mort-
gage" in New York, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 519 (1920).
39. See, Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV.
635; 1 GILMORE, § 2.4.
40. One of the earliest cases to take this position was Lang v. Lee, 24 Va. 410
(1825). See also Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N.Y. 581 (1851); Robinson v. Elliott, 89 U.S.
(22 Wall.) 513 (1874).
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The problem of the power of sale clause was reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Elliott,4
where Justice Davis invalidated such a mortgage and made
the following statement:
It is not difficult to see that the mere retention and use of
personal property until default is altogether a different
thing from the retention of possession accompanied with
a power to dispose of it for the benefit of the mortgagor
alone. The former is permitted by the laws of Indiana, is
consistent with the idea of security, and may be for the
accomodation of the mortgagee; but the latter is incon-
sistent with the nature and character of a mortgage, is no
protection to the mortgagee, and of itself furnishes a
pretty effectual shield to a dishonest debtor.42
Justice Davis went on to note that there are economic rea-
sons for mortgages with powers of sale, but that thereowere
other problems with the case before him. In particular, he
noted that the mortgagor had been in default for twenty-one
months but the mortgagee had not sought to foreclose. Also,
he was no doubt referring to the fact that the mortgagor was
allowed to use the proceeds of sale when he critically noted
that "there is no covenant to account with the mortgagees. ' 43
Later cases picked up on the idea that even though the
power of sale clause posed a problem, it might be overcome
if the mortgagor was rigidly bound to account to the mortga-
gee for the proceeds of sale. The idea apparently was that
such a duty rendered the mortgagor an agent for the mortga-
gee for the purpose of making the sale, and this fiction per-
mitted the courts to accept the power of sale. 4 In addition,
41. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 513 (1874).
42. Id at 523-24.
43. Id at 524.
44. See, e.g., Farmers State Bank v. Anderson, 112 Neb. 413, 199 N.W. 728
(1924). Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, state
as follows:
He [the mortgagee] need merely provide in the mortgage that all the pro-
ceeds of the sales of merchandise shall be turned over to the mortgagee-
bank, and practically all jurisdictions will accept the mortgage as valid for
all purposes. The traditional theory upon which this is based is that ...
[the mortgagor] is now the agent of the bank with a power of sale over the
goods and a duty to account for the proceeds. This unrealistic approach has
become so well known to draftsmen of chattel mortgages that provisions
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the traditional fiduciary relationship between principal and
agent may have induced the courts to impose a constructive
trust where the mortgagor failed to account properly, even
though they might not have done so had they viewed the
relationship between the parties as strictly debtor/creditor.4 5
The ultimate result of all the problems with chattel
mortgages on inventory was that other devices were devel-
oped to meet what, by the sheer number of cases on the sub-
ject, was a pressing need of the business community.
Professor Gilmore notes that:
The problem of the stock in trade mortgage, like the
problem of the after-acquired property interest, eventu-
ally received what might be called a pragmatic solution.
In this instance, however, the solution was long in com-
ing and, when it came, was completely outside the
framework of mortgage law. That is to say, a merchant's
or manufacturer's stock in trade (or, as we shall say, his
inventory) became safely available as security only with
the judicial or statutory validation of such devices as the
trust receipt, the factor's lien and field warehousing.
46
In sum, the courts in chattel mortgage cases simply did
not resolve the issues presented by commingled cash pro-
ceeds resulting from authorized dispositions, and the con-
structive trust, which is the basis on which modem cases
have found a right to trace to commingled cash proceeds,
was necessary in the chattel mortgage cases to find any inter-
est in proceeds, regardless of commingling. The cases im-
posing constructive trusts are not precedent for interpreting
section 9-306(2), primarily because an interest in proceeds
arises automatically under the UCC and the patterns of
financing in chattel mortgage cases were not really analo-
gous to those being explored in the modem context where
stipulating that the mortgagor shall act as agent for the mortgagee have been
incorporated within the instruments.
id at 1345-46.
45. See generall,, Turner v. Williams, 114 Kan. 769, 221 P. 267 (1923), which
strikingly illustrates the different results that could be reached depending on whether
the sale was authorized or not. The case is also interesting because its language fore-
shadows the identification problem encountered under the UCC with commingled
cash proceeds.
46. 1 GILMORE, § 2.5 at 39.
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the debtor is given full power to retain and use cash proceeds
until he defaults on the security agreement.
B. Conditional Sales
The conditional sale was never used extensively as an
inventory financing device, although there are a number of
cases where the buyer was authorized to resell the original
sales item. In Peoples State Bank v Caterpillar Tractor
Co. ,47 the conditional buyer resold tractors purchased under
a conditional sales agreement and deposited the proceeds in
its general banking account, where they were commingled
with funds from other sources. In a decision highly reminis-
cent of recent cases using the constructive trust analogy to
find that commingled funds are identifiable, the court pre-
ferred the conditional seller over a bank exercising a right of
set-off against the account.48 While Peoples State Bank does
offer some support for a right to trace into a commingled
account, it does not represent a widely held position. In fact,
in another case involving similar facts, Kilgore v. State
Bank,49 the court rejected the conditional seller's claim that
he had a trust interest in his buyer's general banking account
and held that the parties' relationship was really one of
debtor and creditor. As with chattel mortgages, the cases on
conditional sales do not support the view that there was a
generally accepted right to trace cash proceeds into commin-
gled accounts prior to the adoption of the UCC.
C. Trust Receipts
Professor Gilmore noted that the right to proceeds was
never really resolved prior to the UCC in the following
except:
47. 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123 (1938).
48. Interestingly, the conditional buyer had already arranged the resale when it
purchased the tractors and had assigned the purchase order and all moneys received
under it to the conditional seller as part of the original agreement. Also, the condi-
tional buyer was referred to by the court as an agent for the conditional seller for the
purpose of resale. Thus, two of the elements present in chattel mortgage cases using
trust terminology, a duty to account and the agency concept, were also present in this
case.
49. 372 Ill. 578, 25 N.E.2d 39 (1938).
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Except in inventory financing, the proceeds problem has
not been of much importance and never will be. None
of the pre-Code statutes dealt expressly with the prob-
lem, except in the context of inventory, but there can be
no doubt that a mortgagee has always been entitled to
trace and take the proceeds received by a mortgagor who
has without authority disposed of the mortgaged prop-
erty. Since there has never been much litigation of this
type, the calculus ,of priorities in proceeds between the
mortgagee and third parties was never thoroughly ex-
plored.5 ° [Emphasis supplied.]
The reference to a pre-Code statutory provision gov-
erning rights as to proceeds is to section 10 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (UTRA), the predecessor of section 9-306
of the UCC.5 1 Because the trust receipt was an important
pre-Code inventory financing device and because the term
"identifiable proceeds" was first used statutorily in UTRA,
this area will be developed in some detail.
The trust receipt was first used in the importation of raw
materials from foreign countries for use in the manufacture
of goods.2 An American bank would issue what amounted
50. 2 GILMORE, § 45.9 at 1336-37.
51. U.C.C. § 9-306, Official Comment: Prior Uniform Statutory Provision.
UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 10 stated as follows:
Entruster's Right to Proceeds.-Where, under the terms of the trust re-
ceipt transaction, the trustee has no liberty of sale or other disposition, or,
having liberty of sale or other disposition, is to account to the entruster for
the proceeds of any disposition of the goods, documents or instruments, the
entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against all classes of
persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time of disposition
by the trustee, as follows:
(a) to the debts described in Section 9(3); and also
(b) to the proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether such pro-
ceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods, documents or instruments, if said
proceeds were received by the trustee within ten days prior to either applica-
tion for appointment of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or
demand made by the entruster for prompt accounting; and to a priority to
the amount of such proceeds or value; and also
(c) to any other proceeds of the goods, documents or instruments
which are identifiable, unless the provision for accounting has been waived
by the entruster by words or conduct; and knowledge by the entruster of the
existence of proceeds, without demand for accounting made within ten days
from such knowledge, shall be deemed such a waiver.
52. For an excellent history of the common law trust receipt, see, Frederick, The
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to a letter of credit guaranteeing the payment of drafts
drawn on an American buyer and in this manner would
finance the buyer's acquisition of the materials. The materi-
als would then be shipped under a bill of lading made out to
the bank directly or indorsed to the bank by the seller.
Under these facts, the bank became the owner of the goods
with full title to them, and it controlled possession of the
goods through the bill of lading. It could then turn the bill
of lading over to the buyer and obtain a receipt containing
the buyer's promise to use the materials only for the tempo-
rary and limited purposes of processing and resale. Under
this scheme, the bank had an effective financing device that
could be used where the collateral was inventory; and the
entire scheme was similar to a pledge of the goods by the
borrower to the bank with a return for a temporary and lim-
ited purpose. While the device is to all appearances a dis-
guised chattel mortgage, the courts validated it and
distinguished it from a pledge on the technical ground that
title was at all times in the bank and never passed to the
buyer.53
Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 395 (1922); Frederick, The Trust Receipt
as Security 11, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1922).
53. The trust receipt may have been inspired by analogy to an outgrowth of the
law of pledges. The pledge was the earliest and safest form of financing device be-
cause it did not allow the debtor to remain in possession and, therefore, did not create
the secret liens that were so abhorrent to the courts. It developed, however, that under
certain circumstances the pledgee could release the collateral to the pledgor for a
temporary or limited purpose without terminating the pledge. This rule is expressed
in § 11 of the RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY as follows:
(2) A pledge is not terminated by delivery of the chattel to the pledgor
for a temporary and limited purpose relating to the maintenance of the
value of the pledgee's interest and having to do with the protection, im-
provement or sale of the chattel, or where the chattel is an instrument or
document, its handling or collection.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 11(2) (1941). See also Sneeden v. Nurnberger's Mar-
ket, 135 S.E. 328 (N.C. 1926); Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 163 S.E. 676 (N.C.
1932); People's Bank v. Continental Supply Co., 280 S.W. 458 (Ky. App. 1926); but
see, Hunter v. Payne, 184 N.Y.S. 433 (N.Y. App. 1921).
This exception to the general rule that the pledgee had to maintain possession
coupled with an extension of the pledge to cases involving intangibles so long as the
underlying obligations were expressed in a controlling writing (the RESTATEMENT re-
fers to the writing as an "indispensable instrument" and defines that term as "the
formal written evidence of an interest in intangibles, so representing the intangible
that the enjoyment, transfer or enforcement of the intangible depends upon posses-
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The receipt executed by the buyer was actually a con-
tract with the bank promising to repay the bank from the
proceeds of sale of the finished product and containing a va-
riety of other provisions. It was not really a trust transaction
because legal title remained in the bank. 4 The trust termi-
nology may have induced courts to allow some tracing, and
the duty to account for proceeds may likewise have been in-
fluential, just as it was in the area of chattel mortgages on
inventory. It is not clear, however, that there was a generally
accepted right to use artificial tracing techniques to follow
cash proceeds right into a commingled account," although
sion of the instrument." RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 1, Comment e) such as an
instrument or document of title, is similar to the development of the trust receipt,
although, as will be seen, the trust receipt is not technically a pledge because legal title
is never in the borrower. See, Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 395, 399-405 (1922).
54. An interesting passage from Professor Gilmore describes two of the most
important provisions of the contract and also suggests an origin for the unusual anal-
ogy between what is essentially a debtor/creditor relationship and the law of con-
structive trusts. It also suggests that this analogy is inapt, an idea that will be
discussed in considerable detail later in this article.
The instrument drafted by counsel for the banks provided that, in considera-
tion of the bank's releasing the goods to its customer, for processing and
resale, 1) the bank should have the right at any time during the manufactur-
ing process, without prior notice and for any reason it deemed sufficient, to
retake the goods and hold them as a pledgee in possession after default; and
2) the bank's lien rights should survive the resale after processing and attach
to the proceeds of sale with the same force and effect as to the goods. The
statement of conditions possibly suggests the analogue of a wrongdoer hold-
ing property (or its proceeds) on a constructive trust for his victim; such a
flight of fancy may explain the curious choice of "trust" to describe the re-
ceipt incorporating the bank's terms which the customer signed. The cus-
tomer--trustee-was not of course a wrongdoer and unlike the trustee, ex
maleficio or otherwise, never had 'legal title' to the goods, which the bank
reserved to itself.
Gilmore, Chattel Security 11, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 762 (1948).
55. In an early case, Carter v. Arguimbau, 31 Abb. N. Cas. 3 (N.Y. Com. P1.
1884), the buyer made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and the financing
bank sought to recover the goods or their proceeds. Noting that title remained in the
bank, the court granted it a right to the goods "and in case of their sale on the specific
proceeds thereof so long as thoseproceeds remain distinguirhablefrom otherfunds." Id
at 5. (Emphasis supplied.) In another early case, Dennistown v. Barr, 31 Abb. N.
Cas. 21; 28 N.Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1893), a bank was granted a similar right to
proceeds which were in the form of an account receivable since the ultimate pur-
chaser had not paid for the goods. The court noted that "[tlhere had thus been no
actual intermingling of the proceeds with the general assets of Thomas M. Barr &
Co." 31 Abb. N. Cas. at 27, 28 N.Y. Supp. at 258. The implication is that the right to
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there is some authority permitting the entruster to do so in
some circumstances.
56
The trust receipt later became a commonplace financing
device in domestic transactions involving such large con-
sumer goods as automobiles and appliances, and in 1935 the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act was promulgated as a general
validating statute that resolved certain conceptual problems
that had arisen in-the case law. Under section 10(c) of
UTRA, the entruster was granted a lien on all "identifiable
proceeds" so long as the trustee was under a duty to account
for proceeds (presumably, this would always be the case)
and the entruster had not waived that duty. The entruster
could waive the duty to account by words or conduct, and
specifically by failing to demand that proceeds be turned
over within ten days after learning of their receipt by the
trustee. In addition, under section 10(b) the entruster had the
right to any proceeds or their value, whether or not they
were identifiable, if they were received by the trustee within
a ten day period prior to insolvency proceedings involving
the trustee or a demand by the entruster for an accounting.
proceeds might have been lost if commingling had occurred. Further, the term "iden-
tifiable proceeds" may have originated in cases like In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165
F. 245 (D.C.N.J. 1908), an insolvency proceeding where goods subject to a trust re-
ceipt were identified in specie and sold, with the proceeds being paid into court. The
entruster was preferred over the bankruptcy trustee in that case, but no question of
commingling was presented.
56. See In re Mulligan, 116 F. 715 (D. Mass. 1902), which involved a debtor
under a trust receipt who became insolvent after turning over proceeds to his broker
to speculate in the stock market. The broker had commingled the proceeds with other
funds in his account and then purchased stock with them. The trust receipt had con-
tained the usual provision requiring the debtor to turn over the proceeds immediately.
The court was prepared to apply artificial tracing principles from the law of trusts but
held that the petitioners had not sustained their burden of proof. The propriety of
this position was not questioned by one of the commentators, who stated:
Suppose the signer of the trust receipt has collected the purchase price
and instead of immediately delivering it to the bank, has deposited it in his
own bank account, in which he continues to make deposits and from which
he pays out by check or otherwise. Obviously, the identity of the money is
lost. Nevertheless, it has a certain resemblance to a mingling of fungible
goods. Any rules regarding the identity of the funds used from time to time
are largely arbitrary-mere presumptions. They are, nevertheless, well rec-
ognized . . . . [They are] the rule with respect to the proceeds of trust re-
ceipt property. [Emphasis supplied.]
Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 555-56 (1922).
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Thus, section 10(b) of UTRA, like section 9-306(4) of the
UCC, clearly contemplated that some proceeds were beyond
the reach of the entruster's lien because they had been ren-
dered unidentifiable, but there was a right to the value of
even unidentifiable proceeds in certain limited situations.
Section 10(b) has generally been seen in the literature as a
special rule for insolvency cases, which it was in part, but it
also gave priority to the entruster for the value of unidentifi-
able proceeds where the entruster had demanded an ac-
counting. Thus, it is likely that at least part of the purpose of
section 10(b) was to encourage the entruster to police the
trustee's account, and if he did so he would have special
rights that would not accrue to him absent such policing.
5 7
Section 10(b) did not limit the entruster's right to proceeds
or their value in the event of insolvency, which was the other
area in which an interest in unidentifiable proceeds would be
protected; it simply gave the entruster the same rights to
unidentifiable proceeds that he could have obtained by de-
manding an accounting on. the tenth day preceding
bankruptcy.
5 8
The important point for the moment is that while the
term "identifiable proceeds" clearly originated in statutory
form with UTRA, the statute built on the foundation of
cases that had discussed proceeds issues for almost a century.
If it is true that, by the time of UTRA's promulgation, the
weight of authority favored artificial tracing of commingled
proceeds (and this is by no means clear), the drafters must
have been aware of that fact. In this atmosphere, a logical
explanation of section 10 is that it was intended to limit the
tracing right except for a limited exception in insolvency
cases and in cases where the entruster had demanded an ac-
counting; and the reason for this limitation may well have
been a desire to promote policing by creditors to enforce the
57. This interpretation, albeit speculative, seems especially appealing since
UTRA was drafted in the period immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Benedict v. Ratner, with its implications regarding policing in the area of
non-notification accounts financing. See text at note 61 infra.
58. This point will be discussed further with reference to the most appropriate
interpretation of U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d), which is the UCC counterpart of § 10(b) of
UTRA. See text at notes 82-86 infra.
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duty to account for proceeds. If this theory is correct, the
implication is that section 9-306, the direct descendant of
section 10 of UTRA, continued this policy. This theory may
explain the following passage from Professor Gilmore with
reference to section 9-306(2):
It should be noted that the interest in proceeds con-
tinues only so long as the proceeds (including collections
received by the debtor) remain "identifiable." . .. The
cut-off point is when the collections cease to be identifi-
able. . ., normally by deposit in a bank account ....
If a securedparty allows his debtor to make and keep col-
lections, he loses his interest (except for a limited right in
insolvency proceedings) when the collections are commin-
gled with other deposits in the debtor's bank account ."
[Emphasis supplied.]
D. Field Warehousing
One final inventory financing device is worth a brief
mention. The field warehouse, even more clearly than the
common law trust receipt, developed out of the temporary
and limited purpose exception that developed in the law of
pledges. 60 The creditor would take advantage of the excep-
tion by establishing an independent warehouse on the
debtor's business premises and obtaining documents of title
in the form of warehouse receipts as new inventory was re-
ceived. These receipts could later be delivered to the debtor,
who would use them to obtain inventory from the warehouse
for the temporary and limited purposes of processing and/or
resale. Frequently, payment was required before the goods
could be removed from thewarehouse. As in the case of the
pledge generally, the cases never really resolved the credi-
tor's right to proceeds generally, much less proceeds in the
form of commingled bank accounts.
Ill. Accounts Receivable
Non-notification financing of accounts receivable is a
twentieth century phenomenon, and its development was
59. 2 GILMORE, § 27.4 at 735-36.
60. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 11, Comment d.
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shaped in large measure by the famous decision in Benedict
v. Ratner. In that case, the Hub Carpet Company assigned
the respondent all its accounts receivable, including future
accounts, but retained the right to collect the accounts pend-
ing default. The company eventually became insolvent and
the petitioner was' appointed as receiver. Both the District
Court and the Second Circuit 6' supported the respondent
and upheld the validity of the assignment, but the Supreme
Court noted the assignor's power to retain and use proceeds
and, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, held that: "Under
the law of New York a transfer of property which reserves to
the transferor the right to dispose of the same, or to apply
the proceeds thereof, for his own uses is, as to creditors,
fraudulent in law and void."62
This decision has been criticized on the ground that it
was based on the ostensible ownership doctrine that had lim-
ited the utility of the chattel' mortgage as an inventory
financing device; but, whatever its basis, it led to what Pro-
fessor Gilmore has referred to, as the professionalization of
non-notification receivables financing. The following ex-
cerpt illustrates the pattern of such financing following Bene-
dict v. Ratner:
To escape from Benedict, the lender was required to ex-
ercise dominion over his security. [Footnote omitted.]
What came to be accepted as the proper way of asserting
dominion in non-notification financing was a require-
ment that the proceeds of collection be remitted daily by
assignor to assignee. Nothing was to go directly into the
assignor's bank account; all checks, notes and accept-
ances must be indorsed and delivered to the assignee.63
Because of procedures such as these, the courts were never
forced to resolve issues involving tracing into commingled
accounts.6
61. In re Hub Carpet Co., 282 F. 12 (2d Cir. 1922).
62. 268 U.S. 353, 360 (1925).
63. 1 GILMORE, § 8.3 at 260.
64. For a thorough discussion of accounts financing generally, see Koessler, .4s-
signment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1945).
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Other accounts financing, such as factoring,65 utilized
the notification method of financing and the issue of com-
mingling did not arise because payments were made directly
to the assignee by the account obligor. The accounts receiv-
able statutes which were developed in the area of non-notifi-
cation financing following the Supreme Court's decision in
Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder66 did
not deal with the issue of commingled proceeds at all. These
statutes were passed to avoid the impact of the Chandler
Act,67 a 1938 amendment to section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, which added the following language to the provisions
on preferential transfers:
A transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the
time when it became so far perfected that no bona fide
purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereaf-
ter have acquired any rights in the property so trans-
ferred, superior to the rights of the transferee therein,
and if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. . . it shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before bankruptcy.
The Klauder case held that under Pennsylvania law a
subsequent assignee could obtain rights superior to a prior
assignee up until the time the account obligor was notified of
the assignment. Since by its very nature non-notification
financing precluded notice to the obligor except after de-
fault, the transfer was deemed to be in consideration of an
antecedent debt and therefore voidable. In other states
where notification of the obligor was not required to obtain
priority over subsequent assignees, the assignment was pre-
sumably not voidable.68
The accounts receivable statutes that followed the Klau-
der decision fell into several different categories, sometimes
requiring recordation as a condition of perfection and some-
65. See Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 745 (1936).
66. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
67. 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1941).
68. See Majority Report of the Committee on Uniform Act on Assignment of Ac-
counts Receivable in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 173 (1944).
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times merely clarifying or reversing a state's common law to
protect non-notifying assignees from subsequent assignees.69
A Uniform Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act was
drafted and took the latter approach;70 but, like the state
statutes, it did not deal in any way with problems stemming
from commingling of proceeds, presumably because Benedict
v. Ratner was believed to be still applicable to the area even
if the threat of Klauder had been removed.
IV. Summary
In summary, there is no consistent treatment of com-
mingled cash proceeds in the context of the pre-Code financ-
ing devices used in the area of inventory and non-
notification receivables financing. In large measure, this can
be explained by the duty promptly to account for proceeds
that was almost universally imposed on debtors. Cases sup-
porting almost any conceivable viewpoint can be found; but
a careful reading of the cases suggests that where trust termi-
nology was employed there was almost always some wrong-
ful act by the debtor, although this act was frequently no
more than a breach of a contractual provision. The signifi-
cance of the breach was magnified, however, by courts that
treated the mortgagor as the agent of the mortgagee for the
purpose of resale. Since the agent's duty to account to his
principal rests on a fiduciary basis, it is not difficult to see
how the courts came to treat a simple breach of contract as
the basis for imposing a constructive trust. This approach
may in part be explained by the courts' desire to approve of
commercial practices while being constrained by the tradi-
tional approach to power of sale clauses. Thus, even the
cases supporting the trust analogy can't really be used as
precedent for typical Article 9 financing arrangements where
the debtor retains full use of the proceeds without being
under a duty to account. Perhaps the bias against the debtor
having full dominion over proceeds could not be broken un-
til the enactment of section 9-205 of the UCC.
69. Id at 174.
70. Id at 180.
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This historical perspective has not attempted an exhaus-
tive review of the case law under each of the pre-Code de-
vices. They are numerous and difficult to reconcile. What
has been presented is a representative sampling sufficient to
refute the belief that there was a generally accepted right to
use artificial tracing rules to follow cash proceeds into com-
mingled bank accounts prior to the adoption of the UCC.
ARTICLE 9'S TREATMENT OF PROCEEDS
IN BANK ACCOUNTS
The 1962 version of Article 9 contained a provision ex-
cluding from its scope "a transfer in whole or in part of..
any deposit, savings, passbook or like account maintained
with a bank, savings and loan association, credit union or
like organization."' 7' While this apparently excluded any in-
terest in bank accounts from the scope of Article 9, it was in
potential conflict with section 9-306(4)(d), which granted the
secured party a limited interest in bank accounts containing
proceeds in the event of insolvency proceedings involving
the debtor. This potential conflict was resolved by cases
holding that section 9-104(k) only excluded the creation of
original security interests in bank accounts and did not apply
to continuing security interests in the form of proceeds de-
posited to bank accounts.72
This explanation was incorporated into the 1972 version
of the Code, which added "deposit account" 73 as a defined
term and revised section 9-104(k) [now at section 9-104(1)]
to exclude from Article 9 "a transfer of an interest in any
deposit account. .. , except as provided with respect to pro-
71. U.C.C. § 9-104(k). In the 1972 version, this provision has been amended and
appears at U,C.C. § 9-104(1).
72. See, e.g., Domain Indus., Inc. v. First Sec. Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d
165, 16 UCC Rep. 1417 (Iowa 1975); In re JCM Coop., Inc., 8 UCC Rep. 247 (W.D.
Mich. 1970); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61 Wis. 2d
671, 214 N.W.2d 33, 13 UCC Rep. 1202 (1974).
73. Deposit account is defined at U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e) as "a demand, time, sav-
ings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association,




ceeds . . . and priorities in proceeds .. . .,, In addition,
the definition of cash proceeds at section 9-306(1) was ex-
panded to include deposit accounts, and amendments to sec-
tion 9-306(4) make it clear that the term "deposit account" is
broad enough to include "separate deposit accounts contain-
ing only proceeds. . . and "deposit accounts ... in
which proceeds have been commingled with other funds
...."76 What remains unclear, however, is whether pro-
ceeds in deposit accounts remain identifiable so that the se-
cured party has a continuing interest in them in non-
insolvency cases to which section 9-306(4) does not apply.
While the meaning of identifiable in section 9-306(2) is
by no means clear, its usage and the usage of words with the
common root "ident---"' 77 in other sections of Article 9 sug-
gest that the draftsmen did not consider it to be the
equivalent of traceable, at least to the extent that tracing in-
volves artificial rules for the allocation of commingled funds.
Section 9-306(2) clearly contemplates some tracing by per-
mitting a security interest to continue in proceeds. The very
process of transferring the interest from property in one
form to property in another form requires that tracing be
employed. Seen in this context, use of the term "identifi-
able" appears to be a modification limiting the right to pro-
ceeds in section 9-306(2). The scope of the limitation is
unclear, however, and there is nothing to suggest that the use
of "identifiable" was intended to prohibit the use of artificial
tracing rules. It may well be that the term was incorporated
straight from section 10 of UTRA without any real consider-
ation as to its meaning.
Whenever cash proceeds are deposited in a bank ac-
count they become part of the bank's general assets and may
be used for any permissible banking purpose. The depositor
becomes a general, unsecured creditor of the bank, and the
74. See FINAL REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITrEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Appendix E-26, at 220-21 (April 15, 1971).
75. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a).
76. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d).
77. An invaluable research tool is Hawkland, UCC Concordance, 1974 ILL. LAW
FORUM 1.
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bank makes no effort to segregate the specific funds of its
various depositors.78 The only evidence of the amount of the
bank's debt is in the records of deposits to and withdrawals
from the account maintained by the bank and the depositor.
The loss of identity, as that word is commonly used, could
not be more complete, and it makes no difference whether
cash proceeds have been deposited to accounts containing
only proceeds or to accounts in which the proceeds are com-
mingled with funds from other sources.
Where the deposit account contains only proceeds,
there is no practical reason why this loss of identity should
prejudice a secured party, and this conclusion is supported
by the revision of section 9-306(1) to include deposit ac-
counts in the definition of cash proceeds. In fact, even with-
out this definitional change a strong argument can be made
that even though the money placed in the account cannot be
returned in specie the account is nonetheless identifiable. Af-
ter all, the cash proceeds have been converted into a single,
intangible bank obligation running in favor of the debtor,
and the account itself can be identified as a whole through
use of the account number designated by the bank.79 The
secured party has traced his proceeds to a specific asset, al-
beit intangible, and he should not be required to prove more
than that cash proceeds of collateral subject to his security
interest were deposited in the account and that no commin-
gling has occurred.
The situation changes when cash proceeds have been
commingled with funds from other sources in a deposit ac-
count. Where the account has been the subject of frequent
deposits from various sources and withdrawals for various
purposes over an extended period of time, the secured party
is unable to show the extent to which the balance at any
given point in time represents proceeds of his collateral. It is
78. In fact, where cash proceeds are in the form of checks, the bank could not
segregate funds in specie since it collects the check from the drawee bank through the
process of bank settlements.
79. This does not necessarily mean that the secured party will prevail in all pri-
ority contests. The treatment of priority rights where the secured party is contesting
the right of a bank to exercise set-off is discussed in text at notes 115-116 infra.
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only by resort to artificial tracing principles such as the
"lowest intermediate balance" 0 rule that courts are able to
make an allocation; and, since the issue most frequently
arises in the context of a priority fight involving the secured
party and the depositary bank8' or some other third party
not involved in the original secured transaction, the use of
artificial tracing rules to permit identification is necessarily
arbitrary. An argument can be made that allocation by this
method is less appropriate in light of the fact that the com-
mingling may well have originally occurred with the consent
of the secured party and may have been allowed to continue
because the secured party permitted the debtor to retain the
proceeds and use them in his business pending default. In
such cases, there is no duty to account to the secured party
for the proceeds, a practice which was almost universally
present in pre-Code cases. Since the secured party has per-
mitted the commingling in the first instance, perhaps the
courts should allow him to suffer the consequence of losing
his security interest rather than resorting to artificial rules
that permit him to prevail over an innocent adversary. This
argument becomes more compelling in cases where the third
party has relied on the balances in the account in its decision
to extend credit to the debtor.
The argument against the secured party, while superfi-
cially appealing, ignores the fact that the UCC specifically
allows secured parties to permit their debtors to retain, use
and commingle collateral and proceeds; and where cash pro-
ceeds are retained for use in the business it would be illogical
to require debtors to keep them segregated. There are cer-
tain risks that a secured party runs when he allows his debtor
to retain and use cash proceeds, but loss of his security inter-
est should not be one of them. It would make no sense for
section 9-205 to validate security agreements where com-
mingling is allowed but then construe section 9-306(2) in
80. See text accompanying note 103 infra, for a detailed explanation of the oper-
ation of the lowest intermediate balance rule.
81. This term is not being used in the technical sense as defined at U.C.C. § 4-
105(a) but rather as a term of convenience to designate the bank at which the debtor
maintains the deposit account.
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such a way as to terminate the security interest in commin-
gled proceeds. The inducement to the secured party to po-
lice his debtor's business should rest primarily on business
reasons. Such a policy is alluded to in Comment 5 to section
9-205, which states that: "Nothing in Section 9-205 prevents
such 'policing' and dominion as the secured party and the
debtor may agree upon; business and not legal reasons will
determine the extent to which strict accountability, segrega-
tion of collections, daily reports and the like will be em-
ployed." In addition, the circumstances in which the bank
holding the proceeds or some other third party will have re-
lied on them in extending credit are rare. These factors sug-
gest the policy of the law ought to be the protection of
secured parties' interests.
Since the Code does not define the term "identifiable,"
it is appropriate to examine its use in sections other than sec-
tion 9-306(2) to gain insights into the drafters' intent, and a
good place to begin is section 9-306(4),82 which defines the
secured party's right to proceeds in the event the debtor be-
comes involved in insolvency proceedings. 83  Section 9-
82. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) states as follows:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a
perfected security interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit ac-
counts containing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is
neither commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit ac-
count prior to the insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like
which are not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which pro-
ceeds have been commingled with other funds, but the perfected secur-
ity interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any
cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the
institution of the insolvency proceedings less the sum of (I) the
payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds re-
ceived by the debtor during such period and (II) the cash proceeds
received by the debtor during such period to which the secured
party is entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection
(4).
83. U.C.C. § 1-201(22) defines insolvency proceedings as "any assignment for
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306(4)84 sharply differentiates between deposit accounts con-
taining only proceeds and commingled accounts. Section 9-
306(4)(a) continues without limitation the interest of a se-
cured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
into separate accounts containing only proceeds; but under
section 9-306(4)(d) the secured party's right to proceeds in
commingled accounts is sharply curtailed. Section 9-
306(4)(d) is the only Code provision that specifically refers to
funds being commingled in a deposit account, and it is worth
noting that while sections 9-306(4)(a)-(c) each contain the
word identifiable, section 9-306(4)(d) does not. One possible
interpretation is that while "deposit accounts" includes both
commingled accounts and accounts containing only pro-
ceeds, the funds in commingled accounts are not identifiable
and the secured party has no enforceable interest in them
except the limited rights granted in insolvency proceedings.
Arguably, this interpretation is consistent with the provisions
of section 9-306(4)'s predecessor, section 10(b) of the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act. Analogies are imprecise, however,
because section 10(b) of UTRA gave priority to the entruster
in non-insolvency cases where a demand for proceeds had
been made, while section 9-306(4)(d) does not.
It must be noted that this is not the conventional analy-
sis of section 9-306(4). Several commentators have sug-
gested that section 9-306(4)(d) simply substitutes a
mathematical formula in insolvency proceedings for a right
to trace proceeds into a commingled account that accrues to
the secured party absent such proceedings by virtue of sec-
tion 9-306(2).85 That is, section 9-306(4)(d) limits the se-
cured party's rights in insolvency rather than conferring
the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the
estate of the person involved."
84. For a detailed explanation of the operation of U.C.C. § 9-306(4) see 2 GIL-
MORE, § 45.9; Epstein, "'Proceeding" Under the Unform Commercial Code, 30 OHIo
ST. L.J. 787 (1969).
85. Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account under Article
9 of the Unform Commercial Code, 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 120 (hereinafter cited as
Skilton); 2 GILMORE, § 45.9; Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232 (1965); Gillombardo, The Treatment of Unform Com-
mercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy.- A Proposed Redraft of§ 9-306, 38 CIN. L. REV.
1(1969).
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additional rights on the secured party where insolvency oc-
curs. This view finds some support in Comment 2(a) to sec-
tion 9-306, which states as follows:
Whether a debtor's sale of collateral was authorized
or unauthorized, prior law generally gave the secured
party a claim to the proceeds .... This section provides
new rules for insolvency proceedings. Paragraphs 4(a)
through (c) substitute specific rules of identification for
general principles of tracing. Paragraph 4(d) limits the
security interest in proceeds not within these rules to an
amount of the debtor's cash and deposit accounts not
greater than cash proceeds received within ten days of
insolvency proceedings less the cash proceeds during this
period already paid over and less the amounts for which
the security interest is recognized under paragraph 4(a)
through (c).
Interestingly, however, Comment 2(a) to the 1962 ver-
sion of section 9-306 stated that section 9-306(4)(d) "relates
to non-identifiable cash proceeds," directly refuting the view
that the section limits rights in the event of insolvency. The
argument that section 9-306(4)(d) is a right-limiting provi-
sion seems to be based on a belief that financers were
granted artificial tracing rights in non-insolvency cases in-
volving commingled proceeds under pre-Code financing de-
vices, but it has been demonstrated that this proposition is
subject to considerable debate and qualification.
The view that section 9-306(4)(d) is a right-limiting pro-
vision fails to take account of the fact that Article 9 is
strongly advantageous to the secured party throughout and
seems to favor the secured party over the bankruptcy
trustee. 86 Viewing section 9-306(4)(d) as restricting the se-
cured party's rights in insolvency proceedings goes against
86. For example, U.C.C. § 9-108 was an attempt to influence bankruptcy courts
into holding, on the basis of state law, that security interests in after-acquired collat-
eral are deemed to be for new value and not for antecedent debts in order to limit the
effect of the voidable preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The policy of
favoring the secured party over the bankruptcy trustee continued in the 1972 revi-
sions, with the most notable example being U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d). Section 9-313 gen-
erally requires an interest in fixtures to be perfected by a recording that is integrated
into the real estate records, but U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) creates an exception that allows
any filing that would be valid under U.C.C. § 9-401 to defeat the trustee.
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this overall trend.8 1 In addition, section 9-306(4) is derived
from section 10(b) of UTRA but does not continue the
UTRA provisions granting an interest in unidentifiable pro-
ceeds following a demand by the entruster for an account-
ing. It is entirely possible that the drafters accidentally
created in section 9-306(4) a statutory lien that gives the se-
cured party additional rights in the event of insolvency. Be-
cause of the wider scope of section 10(b) of UTRA, this
argument could not be made as forcefully with respect to
that provision. The drafters may simply have failed to real-
ize the impact of the accounting provision in section 10(b).
Ultimately, however, it must be conceded that the issue of
identifiability cannot be finally resolved by reference to sec-
tion 9-306(4) any more than it could be resolved by reference
to section 10(b) of UTRA.
Section 9-306(4) is not the only Code provision that can
be employed to shed light on the issue of identifiability of
proceeds. Two other provisions in Article 9 deal with iden-
tifiability of collateral in the context of commingling, and
both suggest that they are mutually exclusive. Section 9-
207(2)(d) provides that "(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when
collateral is in the secured party's possession. . . (d) the se-
cured party must keep the collateral identiable but fungible
collateral may be commingled." [Emphasis supplied.] This is
entirely consistent with the proposition that commingling
destroys identifiability because if fungible collateral that is
commingled remains identifiable then section 9-207(2)(d) is
redundant.
Of more importance is section 9-315, which provides
rules for cases in which goods subject to a security interest
have become commingled or processed. It provides in part
that:
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and
87.. If U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) confers a right on the secured party that he does not
possess absent insolvency proceedings, then that right becomes more vulnerable to
attack by the trustee as a statutory lien under § 545(l)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. That section states that: "The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory
lien on the property of the debtor to the extent that such lien-
(1) First becomes effective against the debtor-
(A) When a case under this title concerning the debtor is commenced.
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subsequently the goods or a part thereof have become
part of a product or mass, the security interest continues
in the product or mass if
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, as-
sembled or commingled that their identity is lost in the
product or mass. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
This provision embodies a straightforward statement that, in
the case of goods, commingling destroys identifiability. It
resolves problems that stem from this result by adopting a
rule that specifically permits continuation of the security in-
terest into the resulting mass. A similar statement in section
9-306 that a security interest in proceeds can continue into a
fungible mass even though identity is technically destroyed
would resolve the issue, but unfortunately such a statement
is lacking.88 Nonetheless, it can be argued that the policy of
section 9-315 should be applied to section 9-306(2) by
analogy.
Summarizing the review of the Code's treatment of the
term "identifiable" (and other words sharing a common
root) in the context of commingling, it appears likely that, if
the drafters considered the issue at all, they did not intend
for cash proceeds commingled with funds from other sources
to remain identifiable; nor did the Review Committee for
Article 9 resolve the issue differently in the 1972 version.
However, there is sufficient ambiguity in the Code, as there
was under pre-Code authority, to permit an expansive read-
ing of "identifiable" if such an interpretation will permit a
more equitable resolution of litigation involving proceeds.
RECENT CASES AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS
I. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank 89
The number of cases holding that "identifiable" in sec-
88. Identification may have a different meaning in Article 2. Under U.C.C. § 2-
501(l)(a), identification of goods to a contract of sale occurs, absent agreement to the
contrary "(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing
and identified." Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-501 suggests that undivided shares in an
identified fungible mass can be identified to a contract of sale, and this is supported
by U.C.C. § 2-105(4).
89. 358 F. Supp. 317, 13 UCC Rep. 109 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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tion 9-306(2) is the equivalent of "traceable" and applying
the constructive trust analogy to permit the use of artificial
tracing rules has become so significant that it represents a
clear trend. In fact, in the recent case of C. 0. Funk & Sons,
Inc. v. Sullivan Eqpt., Inc. ,90 the court summarily disposed of
the issue by pointing out that, in reference to defendant's
argument that commingling destroys identifiability, "the ar-
gument that a proceeds security interest terminates when
those proceeds are deposited in a bank account since they
can no longer be identified has found little favor with the
courts." 91 There are only a few cases decided under the
UCC that suggest that commingled funds are not identifi-
able and those cases were decided under section 9-306(4)
and are not direct authority for interpreting section 9-306(2).
For example, in Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman,92 the court
stated that "[g]enerally, as is true here, proceeds will have
been rendered unidentifiable by having been commingled
with other funds in a simple bank account. 93
Perhaps the best case to illustrate the trend and the
mechanics of tracing is Universal CIT Credit Corp. v.
Farmers Bank. Because the case cuts across so many of the
issues that arise where a secured party asserts a claim to
commingled cash proceeds and because it is the best case for
explaining the operation of the lowest intermediate balance
90. 89 I11. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982).
91. 431 N.E.2d at 372.
92. 113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306, 8 UCC Rep. 1203 (1971).
93. 274 A.2d 306, 310, 8 UCC Rep. 1203, 1207. See also In re Gibson Products
of Arizona, 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 946 (1976), where the
court, in holding that U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) created a preferential transfer under § 60
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, made the following statement:
Section 9-306(4)(d) deals only with nonidentifiable cash proceeds. If cash
proceeds could be "identified," i.e., had not been commingled, the secured
party would have a perfected security interest in the whole fund under § 9-
306(4)(b), just as he did in pre-Code days, without any of the limitations
imposed by Section 9-306(4)(d).
543 F.2d at 656.
The interplay between U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) and the preferential transfer provi-
sions of bankruptcy law has been commented on in several articles. See, e.g., Coun-
tryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 35 (1971); Kennedy, The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency" Article 9, 67 CoM. L.J. 113
(1962); and Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C., Part I.
Proceeds, 77 COM. L.J. 12 (1972).
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rule, a lengthy statement of the facts of the case and the
court's holding will be useful. This statement will be fol-
lowed by critiques of specific issues raised in the case.
In Universal CIT, Gerald Ryan, an automobile
dealer, entered into a floor plan arrangement with plaintiff
under which he was required to remit proceeds as each new
car subject to the arrangement was sold. Plaintiff obtained a
perfected security interest in the cars purchased by Ryan
under the arrangement, together with the proceeds of sale.
Plaintiff at least tacitly approved commingling because re-
mittances were to be by check drawn on Ryan's account at
defendant bank. Plaintiff terminated the floor plan arrange-
ment and Ryan, apparently bitter toward plaintiff, went to
defendant's president after banking hours and told him to
debit the account for a $12,000 demand note which the bank
was holding, and the bank did so with full knowledge that
there were checks outstanding to plaintiff.94  Plaintiff
brought suit on the theory that the defendant's exercise of its
right to set-off amounted to a conversion of collateral subject
to its perfected interest.
The court first noted that even if the commingled pro-
ceeds were identifiable within the meaning of section 9-
306(2), Comment 2(c) to that section suggests that certain
recipients of the funds would take free of the security inter-
est.95 While Comment 2(c) does not specify the precise rea-
son for this result, the idea is apparently bound up in the
concepts of currency and good faith purchase. If the funds
are paid out in the form of a check to a person who qualifies
94. In fact, the bank's president first suggested that Ryan give the bank a check
for $12,000 and Ryan suggested that the account be debited instead because of several
outstanding checks in favor of the plaintiff.
95. Comment 2(c) to U.C.C. § 9-306 states:
(c) Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account
and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds
of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them
as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and transfers in ordi-
nary course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no doubt in appro-
priate cases support recovery of proceeds by a secured party from a
transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the debtor to
defraud the secured party.
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as a holder in due course,9 6 the holder in due course takes
free of the security interest under section 9-309. 97 One of the
risks taken by a secured party who permits commingling is
that his security interest will be severed in this manner. If
the holder of the check knows of the adverse claim to the
funds represented by the instrument, he will not qualify as a
holder in due course, 98 but he may still take free of the secur-
ity interest if he qualifies under the rules of section 9-
308(b). 99 Qualification under section 9-308(b) would be un-
usual in the present context because it requires the giving of
new value and one of the requirements for a bank's exercise
of set-off is that there be a matured debt. °0 In Universal
C T, the court found that the defendant bank did not take
the funds in the ordinary course of its business and therefore
could not benefit from the ordinary course recipient excep-
tion suggested by Comment 2(c). 01
96. U.C.C. § 3-302.
97. U.C.C. § 9-309 states in relevant part that:
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a negoti-
able instrument (Section 3-302). . . and the holders. . . take priority over
an earlier security interest even though perfected. Filing under this Article
does not constitute notice of the security interest to such holders ....
98. U.C.C. § 3-302(l)(c).
99. U.C.C. § 9-308(b) gives priority to a purchaser of an instrument who "gives
new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business..."where
the instrument "(b) . . . is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a se-
curity interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that the . . . instrument is sub-
ject to the security interest."
Arguably, U.C.C. § 9-308(b) does not apply to "second generation" proceeds
such as checks drawn on an account into which the original proceeds have been de-
posited, but there is nothing in the language of the section specifically to prevent its
application in the present context. In any event, it is limited to situations where the
original collateral is inventory.
100. For a general discussion of the conditions under which a bank may properly
exercise set-off, see Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff. A voiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANKING
L.J. 196 (March, 1981). For a discussion of set-off in the context of priority fights
between banks and secured parties claiming a right to proceeds, see Skilton, 1977 So.
ILL. L.J. 120, 186-207.
101. It is difficult to define the contours of the ordinary course recipient exception.
Comment 2(c) to U.C.C. § 9-306 suggests that a fraudulent conveyance would not
shelter the transferee from the security interest, and the court in Universal CI.T
seized on this concept to defeat the bank's claim. The court noted that "Missouri has
long recognized that one indicia of a fraudulent conveyance is a transaction outside
the usual course of doing business," 358 F. Supp. at 324, and then determined that
since the bank's president knew of the checks outstanding to plaintiff and debited
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Having answered this threshhold question in plaintiffs
favor, the court noted that section 1-103 permits the Code to
be supplemented by other bodies of law so long as they are
not displaced by specific Code provisions and concluded that
proceeds are "identifiable" if they can be traced in ac-
cordance with the state law governing the transaction.
Missouri has recognized in an analogous situation-suits
to impose a constructive trust-that special funds may be
traced into commingled funds. . . . The mere fact that
the proceeds from the sales of the six automobiles were
commingled with other funds and subsequent withdraw-
als were made from the commingled account does not
render the proceeds unidentifiable under Missouri
law. 102
The actual tracing was handled by reference to two pre-
sumptions imported from the law of trusts. First, it is pre-
sumed that payments made from the account were made
from individual funds not subject to the trust or, in this in-
stance, the security interest.'0 3 If the balance in the account
Ryan's account after business hours it was not acting in the ordinary course of its
business.
The court failed to emphasize that Ryan approached the bank and that the bank
really did nothing more than act expeditiously to protect its interests. The court's
assumption that this amounted to a fraudulent conveyance is tenuous.
In a state that has adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, it could be
argued that the bank gave a fair consideration, which expressly includes the satisfac-
tion of antecedent debts under § 3(a), and was protected from the plaintiffs claim of
fraudulent conveyance by the good faith purchaser exclusion of § 9. Missouri has not
adopted the UFCA, but it has enacted into statutory form its own good faith pur-
chaser exclusion, although this provision only provides protection where the pur-
chaser has given a "valuable consideration," and antecedent debts would not be so
classified. Mo. REV. STAT. § 428.070 (1978).
Assuming the transfer to defendant was nothing more than a preference at com-
mon law or under the UFCA, it might still be argued that the bank was not the kind
of ordinary course recipient who should take free of an adverse claim to the account
because it was, at the least, on inquiry notice as to the existence of that claim, and one
characteristic of the bona fide purchaser has always been his lack of knowledge or
notice of adverse claims. (The buyer in the ordinary course of business under U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1) is a notable exception to this rule.) Thus, arguably, the court did not have
to go so far as to find a fraudulent conveyance in order to hold that the defendant did
not take the funds in the ordinary course of its business. For further discussion of this
problem, see text at notes 137-141 infra.
102. 358 F. Supp. at 324.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 202, Comment on Subsection (l):(i)
(1957); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 211 (1937). The rule originated as the Rule
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falls below the amount of the funds subject to the plaintiffs
interest that have been deposited in the account, the plaintiff
is limited to the lowest intermediate balance between the
time of commingling and the time at which rights in the ac-
count are to be determined. Second, where additional de-
posits of non-trust funds are made, they are not deemed to
be in restitution of the amount by which trust funds have
been depleted unless the depositor manifests an intention
that there be restitution or the account is maintained as a
trust account rather than an individual account.1°4 The
court applied these presumptions to the transaction as
follows:
It was stipulated at trial that the following deposits
were received by Ryan from the sale of the six
automobiles and their proceeds in which plaintiff held a
continuously perfected security interest:
Vehicle Serial No. Purchaser Date of Deposit Amount
1. 1969 Chev. 866578 Campbell 12-19-69 $5,700.00
2. 1970 Olds. 217371 Faulkner 12-20-69 4,125.00
3. 1969 Chev. 890453 Hunter 1-09-70 1,599.94
4. 1970 Chev. 138013 Carlisle 1-12-70 2,237.50
5. 1970 Olds. 160314 Rone 1-15-70 2,700.00
6. 1970 Chev. 141638 Hendricks 1-15-70 1,705.00
The court has examined the banking records of the Ryan
account and finds that the identifiable proceeds in which
plaintiff held a continuously perfected security interest
on January 15, 1970 prior to the bank's $12,000 debit en-
try was $11,429.11. This amount may be traced accord-
ing to the following summarization:
of Jessel's Bag after the opinion of Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in Knatchbull v. Hal-
lett, 13 Ch.D. 696 (1879). See also 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 515 (3d ed.
1967).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 202, Comment on Subsection (I):(j)
(1957); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 212 (1937).
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"Proceeds"
"Proceeds" End Remaining
Date Deposited Balance in Account
12-18-69 $ 701.74
12-19-69 (1) $5,700.00 $ 9,100.58 $ 5,700.00
12-20-69 (2) 4,125.00 9,709.90 * 9,709.90
12-24-69 6,201.41 * 6,201.41
1-02-70 4,715.30 * 4,715.30
1-09-70 (3) 1,599.94 11,987.65 6,315.24
1-12-70 (4) 2,237.50 15,426.72 8,552.74
1-14-70 6,979.11 * 6,979.11
1-15-70 (5) 2,700.00
(6) 1,750.00 16,340.00 11,429.11
*Lowest Intermediate Balance
On January 15, 1970, the bank debited against the
Ryan account checks aggregating $516.65 and in addi-
tion made the $12,000.00 debit entry in its favor. The
$12,000.00 debit entry was made at 3:00 p.m. after the
close of business. It may, therefore, be inferred that the
checks aggregating $516.65 were received prior thereto
in the ordinary course on January 15, 1970, during bank-
ing hours. The pro forma balance prior to the $12,000.00
debit entry was, therefore, $15,823.35. Subtracting from
this amount the "proceeds" remaining in the account
($11,429.11), the amount which the bank was entitled to
debit was $4,394.24. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the bank the excess amount debited, or
$7,605.76. That amount is identified as proceeds in
which plaintiff had a perfected security interest, and
plaintiff is entitled to recover this amount, together with
interest at 6% from October 26, 1970, the filing date of
the complaint.1
0 5
Having determined the extent of plaintiffs interest, the
Court had to decide the priority issue between a secured
party and a bank exercising its right of set-off. The Court
cited the case of Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co. 106 for the proposition that even though section 9-
105. 358 F. Supp. at 326-27.
106. 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330, 7 UCC Rep. 861 (1975).
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104(i) provides that Article 9 does not apply "(i) to any right
of set-off," this simply means that Article 9 does not govern
the creation of a right of set-off. Under this limited view of
section 9-104(i), priority questions between a secured party
and a bank exercising its right of set-off are still governed by
Article 9, particularly section 9-201.i °7
II. Analogy to Constructive Trusts
There are several points worth exploring arising from
the holding in Universal CL T First, the analogy to the con-
structive trust situation is weak given the facts of the case but
is probably justified in light of the result reached. Histori-
cally, the constructive trust has been used as an instrument
to prevent unjust enrichment. 0 8 It originally rested exclu-
sively on an underlying fiduciary relationship; and this is
still the case in England and in some American states, but
most states have dropped the fiduciary requirement. 0 9 Even
in these latter states, however, there must be some wrongful
act before a constructive trust will be imposed. The Restate-
ment of Restitution suggests that the constructive trust may
be imposed in cases involving conversion, mistake, fraud,
duress and undue influence. 10 Even though the courts did
use the constructive trust analogy in some cases under pre-
Code security devices, the usage generally rested on the
breach of a duty to account for proceeds. Thus, there was a
wrongful act, albeit not of the type suggested by the Restate-
ment of Restitution, under circumstances which the courts
likened to an agency relationship between creditor and
debtor. The combination of the wrongful act and the fiduci-
ary concept flowing from the agency fiction may have origi-
nally induced courts to impose constructive trusts in such
107. U.C.C. § 9-201 provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against pur-
chasers of the collateral and against creditors..." Since this is not a situation where
the Code provides otherwise, the secured party will always defeat the bank to the
extent that it can prove the amount subject to its security interest.
108. See I G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, § 1.1 at 4 (1978) (hereinafter
cited as PALMER); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160 (1937).
109. See cases collected at 38 A.L.R.3d 1354 (1971).
110. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, §§ 163, 166, 168 (1937).
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cases; but, whatever the rationale, the result was justified to
the extent that it encouraged financers to lend on the
strength of inventory as collateral.
The real value of the constructive trust is that its impo-
sition gives rise to a right to trace assets and, ultimately, to a
decree for specific restitution of traced assets.I1 I Tracing,
then, is a remedy that may be employed in circumstances
involving unjust enrichment, not a substantive rule of law
that can be applied absent such circumstances. As men-
tioned previously," 2 some tracing is obviously contemplated
in secured financing through the operation of section 9-
306(2), but it is one thing to permit a certain amount of trac-
ing to specific assets and another thing to permit artificial
allocation of bank accounts. In fact, it might be preferable
analytically to consider these artificial tracing rules as con-
structs altogether divorced from the remedy of tracing one
specific asset into another. 1 3 While section 9-306(2) clearly
permits tracing from one specific asset to another, an argu-
ment can be made that a wrongful act of some sort leading
to the unjust enrichment of a party is necessary before the
constructive trust with its artificial tracing remedy is called
into play.
There are cases where artificial tracing could be used
apart from the provisions of section 9-306(2). Where the
debtor's disposition of the collateral is wrongful as to the se-
cured party, a conversion has occurred and the secured party
should be allowed to trace the proceeds of sale. Where the
111. 1 PALMER, § 2.14 at 175; Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71
N.W. 294 (1897); Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 25 Am. Rep. 152 (1877). For a
general discussion of tracing into commingled accounts in the context of constructive
trusts, see Scott, The Right to Folo4 Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27
HARV. L. REV. 125 (1913); and D.\DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES,
§ 5.16 (1973).
According to Professor Palmer the action in quasi-contract developed at com-
mon law and was used to prevent unjust enrichment. The remedy in quasi-contract
was a personal judgment against the defendant. The constructive trust developed in
equity and was also used to prevent unjust enrichment. The major difference was that
under constructive trust theory a claimant could trace specific assets and obtain a
decree of specific restitution. 1 PALMER, §§ 1.1 at 4-5, 2.2 at 59, 2.14 at 175-77.
112. See text at note 77 supra.
113. Terminology in this area is frequently confusing. For examples, a quasi-
contract is not really a contract and a constructive trust is not really a trust.
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proceeds are commingled in a deposit account and that ac-
count is garnished or subjected to a set-off, the lowest inter-
mediate balance rule should be used to determine the extent
of the secured party's interest in the account. This result can
be achieved, however, by imposing a constructive trust
through section 1-103 rather than section 9-306(2), and the
secured party would not claim a security interest in the pro-
ceeds but rather a right dependent on the conversion. In this
situation, priority between the parties would be determined
under the common law rules governing garnishment or the
right of set-off and not under the Code's priority rules. That
is precisely what happened in Rodi Boat v. Provident Trades-
men's Bank & Trust Co. ,' where the debtor made an unau-
thorized sale of a boat subject to plaintiffs security interest
and deposited the proceeds in his general account with the
defendant. The court held that the unauthorized sale was a
conversion of the boat and that the proceeds were impressed
with a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff.
Since Rodi Boat is the only reported case to date that
has taken this approach, it is unclear to what extent its ra-
tionale will be applied. For example, suppose the security
agreement permits the debtor to sell inventory or collect ac-
counts but requires that the proceeds be deposited in an ac-
count containing only proceeds. If the debtor commingles
the proceeds, he has breached the agreement; but is his ac-
tion sufficiently wrongful to invoke the rationale of Rodi
Boat? If so, then the secured party can obtain some measure
of protection by requiring the segregation of proceeds even if
commingled proceeds are not identifiable within the mean-
ing of section 9-306(2). Similarly, if the secured party has
the right to an immediate accounting and has not waived
that right through lax supervision in the past, an argument
that he should be allowed artificial tracing via section 1-103
is plausible, particularly in light of pre-Code cases. In both
of these situations, however, it could also be argued that
breach of a term in a contract between debtor and creditor,
whatever the effect inter se, should not prejudice the rights of
114. 236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa.), a f'dper curiam 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964).
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third parties. The constructive trust analogy is still weak.
Furthermore, this approach cannot be stretched to cover the
situation where the secured party allows his debtor to use the
proceeds in his business. Requiring the secured party to in-
sist that the proceeds be segregated in such cases would serve
no useful purpose, and so it should not be made a condition
for continuing the security interest in the proceeds. Ulti-
mately, it is simply not possible to resolve the issues by chan-
neling the analysis through section 1-103. The meaning of
"identifiable proceeds" in section 9-306(2) must be tackled
head-on.
The court in Universal CI T was not necessarily wrong
in finding a constructive trust even under a more traditional
analysis. While it is true that the plaintiff permitted the
commingling, it is also true that the debtor, Ryan, commit-
ted a wrongful act against the plaintiff by encouraging the
defendant bank to debit his account at a time when remit-
tance checks had already been drawn in plaintiff's favor. In
addition, Ryan was under a contractual duty to account to
plaintiff for the proceeds. If his actioiis amounted to a con-
version of those proceeds that had been deposited to the ac-
count, then the imposition of a constructive trust and the
subsequent use of the lowest intermediate balance might
have been rationalized through an extension of the Rodi
Boat doctrine and not because the proceeds were identifi-
able under section 9-306(2).
In most instances where a secured party permits com-
mingling, the set-off by the bank will be without the knowl-
edge or consent of the debtor and, unlike Universal CI T,
under circumstances where the debtor is not under a duty to
account to the secured party. In such cases, the underlying
relationship between the parties to the security agreement is
simply debtor/creditor in nature and the debtor will have
committed no wrongful act vis-a-vis the secured party.
Based solely on historical precedent, then, imposition of a
constructive trust in such circumstances is inappropriate; but
there are other considerations. The UCC encourages pre-
cisely this kind of open financing arrangement and there
should be protection for financers who take advantage of the
234
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UCC provisions. Under pre-Code security devices where
there was a duty to account, the constructive trust was used
to protect mortgagees who took the socially desirable risks
associated with inventory financing. From the standpoint of
precedent, the constructive trust was not really appropriate
at that time because the wrongful act was really just a breach
of a contractual duty to account; but its use served an impor-
tant purpose in encouraging financing on secured credit. In
light of these cases, it seems desirable to make a further ex-
tension of the constructive trust to protect Article 9 secured
parties who finance inventory and accounts receivable with-
out requiring their debtors to account. Use of the trust may
rest on a fiction or a weak analogy, but it is ultimately justi-
fied if it promotes a social policy favoring certain kinds of
financing arrangements.
III. Priority Between Secured Party and Bank
Exercising Right of Set-off
A second and more valid criticism of Universal CL T is
its assumption that section 9-104(i) merely excludes the crea-
tion of rights of set-off from Article 9 and does not prevent
the use of Article 9's priority rules in a contest between a
secured party and a bank exercising its right of set-off. This
is the view espoused by Professor Gilmore' 15 and by several
decisions,1 6 most notably Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidel-
ity Union Trust Co. ,1II the case relied on in Universal C T
In Associates Discount, the Court stated its position as
follows:
This section [9-104(i) (1962)], however, cannot mean that
115. 1 GILMORE, § 10.7 at 315-16.
116. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d 764, 29
UCC Rep. 743 (10th Cir. 1980); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Development Co.,
380 N.E.2d 1243, 24 UCC Rep. 1321 (Mo. App. 1980); Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurt-
man, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306, 8 UCC Rep. 1203 (1971); Associates Dis-
count Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330, 7 UCC
Rep. 1350 (1970). In Nat'l Acceptance Co. of America v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498
F. Supp. 1078, 30 UCC Rep. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1980), the court gives an excellent discus-
sion of arguments for and against a limited reading of U.C.C. § 9-104(i). Ultimately,
however, the court does not resolve the issue because it finds that plaintiff would
prevail under either view.
117. I1 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330, 7 UCC Rep. 1350 (1970).
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a general creditor, as the bank is here with respect to the
funds in question, may abrogate a perfected security in-
terest simply by having a right to and opportunity for
set-off. All this section means is that a right of set-off
may exist in a creditor who does not have a security
interest.' 18
If this view is accepted, then a finding that commingled
funds are identifiable, coupled with sufficient proof of daily
balances by the secured party to enable the court to use the
lowest intermediate balance rule, will permit the secured
party to win absent some factor such as estoppel 19 or a sub-
ordination agreement. 120  This is so because section 9-201
generally validates the perfected security interest against
third parties'' except where the Code specifies a different
result, and no other Code provision aids the bank in these
circumstances. 12
2
This view of section 9-104(i) is subject to question, par-
ticularly in cases where the secured party has acquiesced in
both the commingling and the retention of funds by the
debtor. Since the bank, having exercised its right of set-off,
will be in possession of the proceeds, the court is being asked
to alter the status quo between two basically innocent par-
ties. Courts have historically been loathe to intervene in
such situations. 123 Although several recent cases have held
118. 268 A.2d at 332.
119. Estoppel might be raised via U.C.C. § 1-103. For example, the RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION, § 173, at comment j, states that:
Where a person holds property upon a constructive trust, the beneficiary of
the constructive trust may be estopped from asserting his beneficial interest
against a creditor who has extended credit to the constructive trustee, being
induced by the words or conduct of the beneficiary to believe that the con-
structive trustee was the beneficial owner of the property (compare Restate-
ment of Trusts § 313).
120. U.C.C. § 9-316 states that "Nothing in this Article prevents subordination by
agreement by any person entitled to priority."
121. Arguably, perfection is irrelevant in this situation since U.C.C. § 9-201 states
a general Code rule that is not contingent on perfection.
122. Set-off is frequently described as a self-help procedure, although it may also
arise pursuant to statutes. See, Skilon, 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 120, 186-7. In neither event
does the bank acquire rights sufficient to defeat a perfected security interest under any
of the provision of Article 9.
123. See, e.g., Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), a suit by
a drawee to recover funds paid out on a forged bill of exchange. Lord Mansfield
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that section 9-205 indicates a general Code policy that favors
the secured party where commingling occurs,' 24 an equally
valid view is that section 9-205 is neutral as to priorities and
merely repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 25 thereby vali-
dating security interests even though the secured party per-
mits commingling. It does not suggest that there should be
no penalties for commingling, simply that invalidation of the
security agreement is not one of them. 26 In fact, it can be
argued that, on the whole, Benedict v. Ratner was beneficial
in that it required financers to police their debtors' busi-
nesses closely and thus prevented additional losses from pil-
ing up as debtors in financial distress looked to new sources
of credit in an effort to stave off bankruptcy. 27 This is not to
suggest that rigid policing requirements like those developed
refused a recovery, stating that: "It is a misfortune which has happened without the
defendant's fault or neglect. If there was no neglect in the plaintiff, yet there is no
reason to throw off the loss from one innocent man upon another innocent man
. .97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
124. C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Eqpt., Inc., 89 11.2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370
(1982); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 15
UCC Rep. 861 (1975); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26
N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1975).
125. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
126. Neither U.C.C. § 9-205 nor the Official Comments to that section express
approval of the practice of commingling. However; U.C.C. § 9-205 does allow com-
mingling and does not provide that identity ceases when commingling occurs. The
court in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690,
217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1975), a case involving a priority contest between a
garnishing creditor and a secured party, refused a narrow construction of U.C.C. § 9-
306(2) that would have resulted in a concomitant restriction of U.C.C. § 9-205 in the
following passage:
It may be conceded that had plaintiff required its debtor, Flowers, to
maintain a separate bank account into which there should be deposited only
the proceeds of sale of items of original collateral . . . . and had plaintiff
further adequately policed Flowers's handling of such an account, the prob-
lem of tracing 'identifiable proceeds' would have been greatly simplified.
Such cumbersome formalities, however, seem hardly compatible with the
stated underlying purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code 'to simplify
... the law governing commercial transactions' and 'to permit the contin-
ued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties.' G.S, § 25-1-102(2).
217 S.E.2d at 111-12, 17 UCC Rep. at 866.
The court also stated that while U.C.C. § 9-205 and U.C.C. 9-306 did not resolve
the problem "they do indicate strongly the spirit in which the Uniform Commercial
Code is to be applied." 217 S.E.2d at 11, 17 UCC Rep. at 864.
127. Professor Gilmore suggests that U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) is the Code's version of
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after Benedict v. Ratner should be reinstituted, but it may be
worthwhile to encourage a modicum of policing by imposing
some limitations on secured parties who permit commin-
gling. Professor Gilmore suggests that this is the case in the
following excerpt:
Thus, the Benedict-style assignee knew from day to
day the state of his debtor's business health. He would
recognize-or at all events be in a position to recog-
nize-the symptoms of the last fatal plunge toward
bankruptcy .... The assignee's self-interest in this con-
text ran parallel with the interest of his debtor's other
creditors. They benefited from the fact that a profes-
sional with a substantial stake in the enterprise was act-
ing as their policeman. It is reasonable to assume that in
many cases shaky enterprises were preserved as a result
of the timely intervention and that in many others the
final disastrous ballooning of the unsecured debt just
before bankruptcy was prevented by the assignee's cut-
ting off the source of essential working capital.
We may conclude that the Benedict rule produced
some exceedingly good results in forcing non-notifica-
tion receivables financing into a desirable pattern.
12 8
If commingled proceeds are not identifiable, the bank
will always prevail absent some wrongful act since the se-
cured party will have no legally enforceable interest in the
funds in the account. As indicated previously, the secured
party deserves some protection and identification of cash
proceeds through artificial tracing techniques is justified.
However, there should be some limits to this protection.
Benedict v. Ratner and that the Code draftsmen intended to provide incentives for
secured parties to police their transactions:
Under § 9-205, Article 9 repeals the rule of Benedict Y. Ratner and any other
lingering vestiges of Twyne's case. [footnote omitted]. A secured party is no
longer required, as a matter of law, to "police" his debtor's affairs on pain of
having his security transaction treated, if he fails to meet the policing re-
quirements, as a fraudulent conveyance. Nevertheless, the Code draftsmen
recognized as sound the idea that a secured lender, particularly if he takes as
security the inventory and receivables which are the most liquid assets of
any enterprise, should, not only in his own interest but in the interest of
other creditors, be under compulsion to pay close attention to the course of
the debtor's affairs.
2 GILMORE, § 45.9 at 1341.
128. 1 GILMORE, § 8.4 at 261.
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Where the bank, without knowledge that there are proceeds
in the account, actually relies on the account in making its
decision to extend credit, it should take priority over the se-
curity interest. While we have certainly come a long way
since Twyne's Case, it is true that a secured party who authd-
rizes disposition of collateral and commingling of proceeds
may be creating an appearance of financial strength which
his debtor does not actually possess; and third parties who
rely on this appearance to their detriment should be pro-
tected. If section 9-104(i) is read to exclude issues involving
set-off from the scope of Article 9, then the priority rules,
particularly section 9-201, do not apply and the priority con-
test will be decided under the common law of the state. This
is the approach that was taken in Commercial Discount Corp.
v. Milwaukee Western Bank.. 2
9
A detailed discussion of the common law of set-off is
beyond the scope of this article, 30 but courts in this country
have generally applied one of two basic rules. The first rule,
called the legal rule, denies set-off where the bank actually
knows that the funds belong to a third party or if it has
knowledge of circumstances that would place it on inquiry
as to the possibility of an adverse third party interest in the
account.' 3  The second rule, called the equitable rule, re-
quires more than lack of knowledge or notice before the
129. 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33, 13 UCC Rep. 1202 (1974).
130. For a collection of cases on a bank's right to set off, see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d
235 (1971); see also Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANK.
L.J. 196 (1981); Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands Compensatiofrom
Rome to California, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 224 (1965).
131. The following excerpt from Universal C. T indicates the type of knowledge
the court thought would be necessary to defeat a bank's right of set-off under the legal
rule:
An exception to that general rule is that a bank is not entitled to a set-off
where it has sufficient knowledge of facts relating to the interests of others in
the account as to put the bank on inquiry to ascertain the trust character of
the account. . . . The bank's knowledge that Ryan had floor plan financing
with plaintiff, that Ryan issued checks to plaintiff and Ryan's insistence that
bank run a debit against his account, coupled with communication of such
facts after banking hours, were sufficient to put the bank on inquiry as to the
possible trust character of all or part of the funds deposited in Ryan's
account.
358 F. Supp. at 325.
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bank can exercise its right of set-off. 132 Under this rule, the
bank must also show that it changed its position in reliance
on the debtor's account in order to create superior equities.
It is difficult to conceive of many situations in which a bank
could be said to have relied on an account when the debtor
has the right at any time to withdraw all the funds, and the
secured party would usually prevail. However, the rule does
provide for flexibility and thus permits more equitable re-
sults. For example, if a bank, without knowledge that an
account contained proceeds, advanced money to the debtor
on the condition that the account never be depleted beyond
a certain level and then placed a hold on the account at that
level, it should prevail in a priority fight with the secured
party. At the other extreme, if it merely considered the ac-
count as one asset in the debtor's total financial structure, it
should not prevail. Between these extremes are a wide range
of possibilities that would best be disposed of on an ad hoc
basis. At the very least, however, it would seem that a bank
should contractually require the debtor to maintain a mini-
mum balance in the account before it could claim to have
relied on the account.
While it is true that banks will rarely prevail under the
approach suggested above, it must be recognized that in
most cases there is no reason to prefer the bank over the
secured party. The bank is frequently a general creditor
which, by fortuitous circumstances, is able to seize and apply
funds of the debtor without -resort to legal process. In a
sense, the lowest intermediate balance rule is a method of
splitting the pie between the parties, and this result may
seem appropriate to courts that are sensitive to the value of
secured financing in our society and to the need to protect
secured parties where doing so will not work an injustice. In
fact, an argument can be made that where the secured party
is granted priority the tracing rules should be modified so
that non-proceed funds deposited to the account are deemed
to be in restitution of prior proceed deposits to the extent
132. Cases adopting the equitable rule generally trace their lineage to the U.S.




that they have been depleted by withdrawals. Since the allo-
cation is in any event arbitrary, however, it seems preferable
to retain the present approach as a means of splitting the pie
between the two innocent parties.'
33
Once a court determines that commingled funds are
identifiable, the best approach to the secured party/bank
conflict is to give an expansive reading to section 9-104(i)
and then adopt the equitable rule of bank set-off. It should
be noted that this rule would govern priorities in cases in-
volving commingled accounts and in cases where the ac-
count subjected to set-off contains only proceeds. The
rationale 3 4 for this approach is expressed well in the follow-
ing excerpt from Commercial Discount:
The "equitable" rule is the better rule because it elimi-
nates the problems of proving knowledge on the part of
the institution. This rule is not harsh as applied to the
bank because a bank is in a superior position to all other
creditors because it has funds of its debtor at its disposal
to immediately seize and apply as a set-off. (The right of
set-off is based on the dual relationship of the bank and
depositr-the bank being a debtor to the depositor and
a creditor on a loan at the same time.) Other creditors
can exercise the right of set-off only as a partial or full
defense to an action brought against them by the
debtor/creditor. 
35
Adoption of the equitable rule provides an incentive for the
133. To the effect that the secured party bears the burden of proof, see, Domain
Indus., Inc. v. First Sec. Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d 165, 16 UCC Rep. 1417 (Iowa
1975); Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279, i UCC Rep. 515
(W.D. Pa. 1962). In C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d
659, 415 N.E.2d 1309, 30 UCC Rep. 1459 (1981), aI'd, 89 Il.2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370
(1982), the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected the secured party's suggestion that it
trace by looking at the debtor's "large asset picture." This apparently meant that the
secured party would only have to prove that proceeds went into the account initially
and would not have to present evidence of daily deposits and withdrawals in order to
calculate the lowest intermediate balance. The court held that the secured party had
failed to sustain its burden of proof under the lowest intermediate balance rule.
134. Originally, the rationale for the equitable rule seemed to be the idea that the
antecedent debt to the bank did not provide value to support the set-off where there
was a conflicting claim to the funds in the account. Skilion, 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 120,
192. See, Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123
(1938).
135. 214 N.W.2d 33, 39, 13 UCC Rep. 1202, 1207-8.
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secured party to engage in some "policing" by exposing him
to the danger of set-off but does not reward the bank merely
because it is in a favorable position to obtain funds in the
debtor's possession.
136
IV. Garnishors and. Transferees in the Ordinary Course
Of course, a recognition of the right of the secured party
to use artificial tracing rules to assert his claim against com-
mingled funds will not protect him in all cases. As men-
tioned previously, recipients in the ordinary course will still
sever his security interest, and presumably this includes de-
positary banks which receive payment by some method
other than set-off. For example, in Anderson, Clayton & Co.
v. First American Bank, 137 the debtor drew a check payable
to the depositary bank on an account containing proceeds
from the disposition of collateral subject to the plaintiffs se-
curity interest. The court held that while the rationale of
Comment 2(c) to section 9-306138 was potentially applicable
in favor of the bank, the bank was not a transferee in the
ordinary course under the facts of the case. The court analo-
gized the transferee in ordinary course who takes commin-
gled funds free of an adverse security interest to a buyer in
the ordinary course of business under the UCC and noted
that the definition of the latter term at section 1-201(9) in-
volves the concepts of good faith and lack of knowledge.
The court then held that "[tihe circumstances surrounding
this transfer reveal[ed] that Bank demanded payment of a
note not yet due out of an account known to it to contain the
proceeds of the sale of collateral."'' 39 The secured party was
allowed to follow its proceeds from the account to the bank
136. In National Acceptance Co. of America v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.
Supp. 1078, 30 UCC Rep. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1980), the court gives an excellent discus-
sion of the arguments for and against an expansive reading of U.C.C. § 9-104(i) and a
good discussion of the legal and equitable rules of set-off. Ultimately, it does not
resolve the issues in Virginia because of a finding that the defendant bank would lose
under any circumstances.
137. 614 P.2d 1091, 29 UCC Rep. 280 (Okla. 1980).
138. The text of Comment 2(c) is set out at note 95 supra.




Where lien creditors, primarily garnishors, are involved,
allowing artificial tracing will result in priority for the se-
cured party to the extent to which he can prove the lowest
intermediate balance. This result stems from section 9-
301 (1)(b) and assumes that the secured party's interest is per-
fected. 14  As with set-off under the equitable rule, however,
this result is not necessarily inappropriate since it is unlikely
that the lien creditor will have relied on the funds in the ac-
count in making the original extension of credit. In fact, it is
far less likely that a non-bank creditor will have actually re-
lied on the existence of funds in a deposit account than that
a bank, which can exercise some control over the account,
will have done so.
V. Following Commingled Proceeds into New Assets
Another result of permitting artificial tracing is that it
will allow secured parties in some circumstances to trace
proceeds out of the commingled account and into new assets
purchased by the debtor. C 0. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan
Eqpt., Inc. 142 involved a contest between two secured parties.
Plaintiff had a perfected interest in specific items of inven-
tory and a bank had a later perfected interest in all inven-
tory. The debtor sold the specific items for cash and
commingled the cash with funds from other sources in its
general banking account. It then used the funds in the ac-
count to purchase more inventory, traded that inventory for
still more inventory, and finally sold that inventory at auc-
tion and deposited the cash proceeds with the court. The
140. In Farns Assoc., Inc. v. South Side Bank, 93 I11. App. 3d 766, 417 N.E.2d
818, 30 UCC Rep. 1729 (1981), plaintiff and defendant had both perfected security
interests in debtor's accounts under circumstances giving priority to plaintiff. Defend-
ant had failed to discover plaintiffs filed financing statement. Defendant then re-
ceived checks payable to the debtor from an account debtor, supplied debtor's
indorsement, collected the checks and applied the proceeds to its loan to debtor. In
holding that this amounted to a conversion, the Court differentiated the case from one
where a party receives a check drawn on the debtor's bank account in the ordinary
course of business.
141. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App.
690, 217 S.E.2d 108, 17 UCC Rep. 861 (1975).
142. 89 lll.2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982).
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court accepted the view that plaintiff had a potential claim to
the deposit but ruled in favor of the bank on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to submit sufficient evidence to allow cal-
culation of the lowest intermediate balance in the debtor's
general banking account.
The court in C 0. Funk & Sons did not discuss whether
plaintiffs interest in the proceeds had become unperfected
by operation of section 9-306(3)(a),143 although that provi-
sion is a potential limitation on the secured party's interest in
assets purchased with funds from a commingled account.
Lack of perfection would subject the secured party to the
interests of lien creditors, other secured parties and purchas-
ers not in the ordinary course of business. In this circum-
stance, the secured party would obtain greater protection
from the 1962 version of section 9-306(3), 44 which made it
easier for him to have a perfected interest in proceeds.
In another case, Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v.
Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. ,"45 the court held that funds could
be traced out of the debtor's general banking account and
into cars which were not specifically subject to the security
agreement. While the court did not discuss the problems of
tracing in this context, it did remand the case for a determi-
nation of "what other moneys were in the . ..bank ac-
counts at the time the new automobiles were purchased.
There should be determined the daily balance of each ac-
count and the parties may consider whether tracing is lim-
ited in any way if funds from other sources were present in
these accounts."'
146
143. Under U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a), the security interest in proceeds is temporarily
perfected for ten days but then ceases to be perfected unless:
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the pro-
ceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by
filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been
filed and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description
of collateral in the financing statement indicates the types ofproperty con-
stituting the proceeds. . . .[Emphasis supplied.]
144. Under the 1962 version of U.C.C. § 9-306(3), a security interest in proceeds
was temporarily perfected for ten days and then continuously perfected if "(a) a filed
financing statement covering the original collateral also covers proceeds."
145. 25 Pa. D. & C. 2d 395, 1 UCC Rep. 531 (Pa. Ct. Coin. P1. 1958).
146. 25 Pa. D. & C. 2d 395, 402, 1 UCC Rep. 531, 536.
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TRACING PROCEEDS
One potential difficulty in this area is that if commin-
gled proceeds are identifiable then the lowest intermediate
balance rule may lead to odd results in some cases where the
secured party is seeking to trace funds out of the account and
into a new asset. For example, suppose the secured party
has a security interest in a specific good, such as a boat, and
the debtor makes an unauthorized sale of the boat for
$10,000 and commingles the proceeds in his general banking
account with $10,000 in funds from other sources. If the
debtor purchases a replacement boat for $10,000 and then
pays out the other $10,000 in the ordinary course of business,
application of the lowest intermediate balance rule results in
the secured party failing to have a security interest in the
replacement boat because it is presumed that the first money
withdrawn from the account was the debtor's individual
funds. 47 In such cases, courts desirous of protecting secured
parties in general may want to adopt, as a corollary to the
lowest intermediate balance rule, a rule that where the sale is
unauthorized and the proceeds are used within a brief period
of time to purchase an item that is an obvious replacement
for the original collateral, the security interest can be traced
through the account and attach to the replacement item.
However, another way to view the problem is that the se-
cured party could have protected himself by providing for
the security interest to attach to the replacement item
through the use of an after-acquired property clause and
should not be protected from his failure to do so.
CONCLUSION
This article has not attempted an exhaustive analysis of
potential priority disputes, the intricacies of tracing or the
common law rules governing set-off. 14 8 What it has done is
to suggest that the UCC is unclear about the meaning of
147. This situation is ameliorated in cases where the security agreement contains
an after-acquired property clause as permitted by U.C.C. § 9-204(1). In cases where
the disposition of the original collateral is authorized, which are the primary focus of
this article, it is likely that the security agreements will contain after-acquired prop-
erty clauses.
148. The most exhaustive treatment of these topics to date in the context of se-
cured transactions is the excellent article by Skilton at 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 120.
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identifiability and that the draftsmen, to the extent they con-
sidered the problem at all, probably did not equate identifi-
cation with the use of artificial tracing rules, at least in cases
where both the disposition of original collateral and the
commingling of cash proceeds are authorized. It has also
attempted to demonstrate that the analogy to constructive
trusts made by several recent cases is faulty historically but
justified on the basis of the result achieved. There is nothing
so constant in the law as change, and old theories are contin-
ually being modified and expanded to deal with new situa-
tions. The constructive trust is not new to the area of
secured financing, but the recent cases have applied it to new
situations and it is important to recognize what they are do-
ing in its historical context.
It would be perfectly consistent with the Code for courts
to hold that commingling destroys identifiability, and this
position might even be desirable to the extent that it pro-
vides incentives for secured parties to police their debtors'
affairs to a moderate extent. Nonetheless, secured financing
plays an important role in our economy and analysis sug-
gests that application of artificial tracing rules will not de-
stroy all incentives to police, nor will it result in injustice
considering the nature of the parties likely to be involved in
contests with secured parties. The ultimate conclusion,
then,is that notwithstanding the drafters' intent there is noth-
ing to prohibit courts from construing "identifiable" to mean
"traceable" and then imposing constructive trusts to permit
artificial allocation of commingled accounts. Recent cases
that have taken this approach seem to have intuitively strug-
gled to the right result.
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